1932

Abstract

The range of organizational responses to regulatory requirements is often explained by describing the organization as a monolithic actor interacting with external agents. We look inside regulated organizations, recognizing them as a web of transactions and norms, to examine how formal and informal organizational practices transform regulatory requirements into normalized activity. This article identifies four levers used at the coalface—or frontline—of the organization to encourage compliance in organizations: nudge (individual), bureaucracy (roles, rules, and procedures), relational governance (network), and organizational culture (assumptions, values, and artifacts). We map the range of research on coalface governance while displaying the assumptions and implications of each lever often embedded in recommendations to policy makers or organizational managers. We offer this continuum of techniques to invite a richer conversation about ways of pursuing compliance in organizations.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084716
2018-10-13
2024-04-24
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/lawsocsci/14/1/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084716.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084716&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Agrawal A, Chhatre A, Gerber ER 2015. Motivating crowding in sustainable development interventions. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 109:3470–87
    [Google Scholar]
  2. Aimone JA, Ball S, King-Casas B 2016. “Nudging” risky decision-making: the causal influence of information order. Econ. Lett. 149:161–63
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Altmann S, Traxler C 2014. Nudges at the dentist. Eur. Econ. Rev. 72:19–38
    [Google Scholar]
  4. Am. Chem. Soc. 2012. Creating Safety Cultures in Academic Institutions: A Report of the Safety Culture Task Force of the American Chemical Society Committee on Chemical Safety Washington, DC: Am. Chem. Soc.
  5. Amengual M, Apfelbaum EP 2017. Justifying sustainability: a field experiment on moral and instrumental reasoning in organizations Prelim. Draft, Mass. Inst. Technol. Cambridge, MA:
  6. Amengual M, Coslovsky S, Yang D 2017. Who opposes labor regulation? Explaining variation in employers’ opinions. Regul. Gov. 11:4404–21
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Anderson LM, Bateman TS 2000. Individual environmental initiative: championing natural environmental issues in US business organizations. Acad. Manag. J. 43:4548–70
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Arieli A, Ben-Ami Y, Rubinstein A 2011. Tracking decision makers under uncertainty. Am. Econ. J. Microecon. 3:68–76
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Assoc. Press. 1989. Inquiry finds laxity at root of 35 rail deaths last year. Associated Press Nov. 7. https://www.apnews.com/63927261f6ce89a4df4bcdea776feb8e
  10. Assoc. Public Land Grant Univ. 2016. A Guide to Implementing a Safety Culture in Our Universities Washington, DC: Assoc. Public Land Grant Univ.
  11. Attari SZ, Gowrisankaran G, Simpson T, Marx SM 2014. Does information feedback from in-home devices reduce electricity use? Evidence from a field experiment Pap Univ. Ariz. Tucson: http://www.u.arizona.edu/∼gowrisan/pdf_papers/electricity_use_in_home_devices.pdf
  12. Ayres I, Braithwaite J 1995. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate New York: Oxford Univ. Press
  13. Ayres I, Raseman S, Shih A 2009. Evidence from two large field experiments that peer comparison feedback can reduce residential energy usage NBER Work. Pap. 15031. http://www.nber.org/papers/w15031.pdf
  14. Baker Panel 2007. The Report of the B.P. U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Houston: BP US https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/BakerPanel2007Jan.pdf
  15. Baldwin R 2014. From regulation to behaviour change: giving nudge the third degree. Mod. Law Rev. 77:6831–57
    [Google Scholar]
  16. Bardach E, Kagan R 1980. Going by the Book Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press
  17. Barile L, Cullis J, Jones P 2015. Will one size fit all? Incentives designed to nurture prosocial behavior. J. Behav. Exp. Econ. 57:9–16
    [Google Scholar]
  18. Barley SR 2008. Coalface institutionalism. The Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism R Greenwood, C Oliver, TB Lawrence, RE Meyer 338–64 London: Sage
    [Google Scholar]
  19. Barnes J, Burke TF 2012. Making way: legal mobilization, organizational response, and wheelchair access. Law Soc. Rev. 46:1167–98
    [Google Scholar]
  20. Basu ON, Dirsmith MW, Gupta PP 1999. The coupling of the symbolic and the technical in an institutionalized context: the negotiated order of the GAO's audit reporting process. Am. Sociol. Rev. 64:4506–26
    [Google Scholar]
  21. Benhassine N, Devoto F, Duflo E, Dupas P, Pouliquen V 2015. Turning a shove into a nudge? A “labeled cash transfer” for education. Am. Econ. J. Econ. Policy 7:386–125
    [Google Scholar]
  22. Bergus GR, Levin IP, Elstein AS 2002. Presenting risks and benefits to patients. J. Gen. Intern. Med. 17:8612–17
    [Google Scholar]
  23. Boiral O 2007. Corporate greening through ISO 14001: A rational myth. Organ. Sci. 18:1127–46
    [Google Scholar]
  24. Boltanski L, Chiapello E 2005. The new spirit of capitalism. Int. J. Politics Cult. Soc. 18:161–88
    [Google Scholar]
  25. Briscoe F, Kellogg KC 2011. The initial assignment effect: local employer practices and positive career outcomes for work-family program users. Am. Sociol. Rev. 76:2291–319
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Bronchetti ET, Huffman DB, Magenheim E 2015. Attention, intentions, and follow-through in preventive health behavior: field experimental evidence on flu vaccination. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 116:270–91
    [Google Scholar]
  27. Bruns HC 2009. Leveraging functionality in safety routines: examining the divergence of rules and performance. Hum. Relat. 62:91399–426
    [Google Scholar]
  28. Canales R 2011. Rule bending, sociological citizenship, and organizational contestation in microfinance. Regul. Gov. 5:190–117
    [Google Scholar]
  29. Carpenter D 2010. Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  30. Castilla EJ 2011. Bringing managers back in: managerial influences on workplace inequality. Am. Sociol. Rev. 76:5667–94
    [Google Scholar]
  31. Castilla EJ 2015. Accounting for the gap: a firm study manipulating organizational accountability and transparency in pay decisions. Organ. Sci. 26:2311–33
    [Google Scholar]
  32. Cialdini RB 2003. Social influence: compliance and conformity. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 55:591–621
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Codagnone C, Veltri GA, Bogliacino F, Lupiáñez-Villanueva F, Gaskell G et al. 2016. Labels as nudges? An experimental study of car eco-labels. Econ. Politica 33:403–32
    [Google Scholar]
  34. Coglianese C 2016. Performance-based regulation: concepts and challenges. Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global Regulatory Process F Bignami, D Zaring Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar
    [Google Scholar]
  35. Coglianese C, Nash J 2001. Regulating from the Inside: Can Environmental Management Systems Achieve Policy Goals? Washington, DC: Resour. Future
  36. Coslovsky SV 2011. Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: the organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness. Regul. Gov. 5:170–89
    [Google Scholar]
  37. Costa DL, Kahn ME 2013. Energy conservation “nudges” and environmentalist ideology: evidence from a randomized residential electricity field experiment. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 11:3680–702
    [Google Scholar]
  38. Dalton M 1950. Conflicts between staff and line managerial officers. Am. Sociol. Rev. 15:3342–51
    [Google Scholar]
  39. Deci EL, Koestner R, Ryan RM 1999. Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation in education: reconsidered once again. Rev. Educ. Res. 71:11–27
    [Google Scholar]
  40. Delmas MA, Fischlein M, Asencio OI 2013. Information strategies and energy conservation behavior: a meta-analysis of experimental studies from 1975 to 2012. Energy Policy 61:729–39
    [Google Scholar]
  41. Delmas MA, Toffel MW 2008. Organizational responses to environmental demands: opening the black box. Strat. Manag. J. 29:101027–55
    [Google Scholar]
  42. Diamond S 1986. Chernobyl causing big revisions in global nuclear power policies. New York Times Oct 27 1
  43. Dobbin F 2009. Inventing Equal Opportunity Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  44. Dobbin F, Kelly EL 2007. How to stop harassment: professional construction of legal compliance in organizations. Am. J. Sociol. 112:41203–43
    [Google Scholar]
  45. Edelman LB 1992. Legal ambiguity and symbolic structures: organizational mediation of civil rights law. Am. J. Sociol. 97:61531–76
    [Google Scholar]
  46. Edelman LB 2016. Working Law: Courts, Corporations, and Symbolic Civil Rights Chicago Ser. Law Soc. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  47. Edelman LB, Fuller SR, Mara-Drita I 2001. Diversity rhetoric and the managerialization of law. Am. J. Sociol. 106:61589–641
    [Google Scholar]
  48. Edelman LB, Krieger LH, Eliason SR, Albiston CR, Mellema V 2011. When organizations rule: judicial deference to institutionalized employment structures. Am. J. Sociol. 117:3888–954
    [Google Scholar]
  49. Edelman LB, Petterson S, Chambliss E, Erlanger HS 1991. Legal ambiguity and the politics of compliance: affirmative action officers’ dilemma. Law Policy 13:173–97
    [Google Scholar]
  50. Edelman LB, Uggen C, Erlanger HS 1999. The endogeneity of legal regulation: grievance procedures as rational myth. Am. J. Sociol. 105:2406–54
    [Google Scholar]
  51. Eigen Z 2012. When and why individuals obey contracts: experimental evidence of consent, compliance, promise, and performance. J. Leg. Stud. 41:167–93
    [Google Scholar]
  52. Emirbayer M 1997. Manifesto for a relational sociology. Am. J. Sociol. 103:2281–317
    [Google Scholar]
  53. Engdahl O 2014. Ensuring regulatory compliance in banking and finance through effective controls: the principle of duality in the segregation of duties. Regul. Gov. 8:3332–49
    [Google Scholar]
  54. Espeland W, Vannebo BI 2007. Accountability, quantification and law. Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 3:21–43
    [Google Scholar]
  55. Evans E, Maio GR, Corner A, Hodgetts CJ, Ahmed S, Hahn U 2012. Self-interest and pro-environmental behavior. Nat. Clim. Change 3:122–25
    [Google Scholar]
  56. Evans J, Silbey SS 2017. Beyond compliance: reproducing professional control by assembling safety culture at the lab bench Work. Pap. presented at the European Group for Organizational Studies July 21
  57. Feiler DC, Tost LP, Grant AM 2012. Mixed reasons, missed givings: the costs of blending egoistic and altruistic reasons in donation requests. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 48:1322–28
    [Google Scholar]
  58. Ferraro PJ, Miranda JJ, Price MK 2011. The persistence of treatment effects with norm-based policy instruments: evidence from a randomized environmental policy experiment. Am. Econ. Rev. 101:3318–22
    [Google Scholar]
  59. Ford C 2013. Innovation-framing regulation. Ann. Am. Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 649:176–97
    [Google Scholar]
  60. Frey B, Oberholzer-Gee F 1997. The cost of price incentives: an empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out. Am. Econ. Rev. 87:4746–55
    [Google Scholar]
  61. Friedman LM 2010. Access to justice: some historical comments. Fordham Law Rev 37:13–38
    [Google Scholar]
  62. Galison P 2004. Removing knowledge. Crit. Inq. 31:229–43
    [Google Scholar]
  63. Gherardi S, Nicolini D 2000. To transfer is to transform: the circulation of safety knowledge. Organization 7:329–48
    [Google Scholar]
  64. Glassner D 2010. The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid of the Wrong Things New York: Basic Books
  65. Goswami I, Urminsky O 2016. When should the ask be a nudge? The effect of default amounts on charitable donations. J. Market Res. 53:5829–46
    [Google Scholar]
  66. Gouldner AW 1954. Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy New York: Free Press
  67. Grant DS, Bergesen AJ, Jones AW 2002. Organizational size and pollution: the case of the US chemical industry. Am. Sociol. Rev. 67:3389–407
    [Google Scholar]
  68. Gray GC 2011. Constraints to upholding workplace safety laws and regulations within organizations. Droit Soc 1:7757–68
    [Google Scholar]
  69. Gray GC, Silbey SS 2014. Governing inside the organization: interpreting regulation and compliance. Am. J. Sociol. 120:196–145
    [Google Scholar]
  70. Gray WB, Shadbegian RJ 2005. When and why do plants comply? Paper mills in the 1980s. Law Policy 27:2238–61
    [Google Scholar]
  71. Grouzet FM, Kasser T, Ahuvia A, Dols JM, Kim Y et al. 2005. The structure of goal contents across 15 cultures. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 89:5800–16
    [Google Scholar]
  72. Grune-Yanoff T 2016. Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence. Econ. Philos. 32:463–83
    [Google Scholar]
  73. Grune-Yanoff T, Hertwig R 2016. Nudge versus boost: How coherent are policy and theory. Minds Mach 26:1–2149–83
    [Google Scholar]
  74. Gunningham N, Grabosky P, Sinclair D 1998. Smart regulation. Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications P Drahos Acton, Aust.: ANU Press
    [Google Scholar]
  75. Gunningham N, Kagan RA, Thornton D 2003. Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
  76. Gunningham N, Sinclair D 1999. Integrative regulation: a principle-based approach to environmental policy. Law Soc. Inq. 24:4853–96
    [Google Scholar]
  77. Haines F 2011. Addressing the risk, reading the landscape: the role of agency in regulation. Regul. Gov. 5:1118–44
    [Google Scholar]
  78. Hawkins K 1983. Bargaining and bluff: compliance strategy and deterrence in the enforcement of regulation. Law Policy 5:135–73
    [Google Scholar]
  79. Hawkins K, Thomas JM 1984. The enforcement process in regulatory bureaucracies. Enforcing Regulation K Hawkins, Thomas JM Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff
    [Google Scholar]
  80. Heimer CA 1988. Social structure, psychology, and the estimation of risk. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 14:491–519
    [Google Scholar]
  81. Heimer CA 1999. Competing institutions: law, medicine, and family in neonatal intensive care. Law Soc. Rev. 33:117–66
    [Google Scholar]
  82. Heimer CA 2008. Thinking about how to avoid thought: deep norms, shallow rules, and the structure of attention. Regul. Gov. 2:130–47
    [Google Scholar]
  83. Heimer CA 2013. Resilience in the middle: contributions of regulated organizations to regulatory success. Ann. Am. Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 649:1139–56
    [Google Scholar]
  84. Heimer CA, Petty J 2010. Bureaucratic ethics: IRBs and the legal regulation of human subjects research. Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 6:601–26
    [Google Scholar]
  85. Heimer CA, Staffen L 1998. For the Sake of the Children: The Social Organization of Responsibility in the Hospital and the Home Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  86. Hertwig R, Erev I 2009. The description-experience gap in risky choice. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13:12517–23
    [Google Scholar]
  87. Hertwig R, Hoffrage UABC Res. Group 2013. Simple Heuristics in a Social World New York: Oxford Univ. Press
  88. Hilton D, Charalambides L, Demarque C, Waroquier L, Raux C 2014. A tax can nudge: the impact of an environmentally motivated bonus/malus fiscal system on transport preferences. J. Econ. Psychol. 42:17–27
    [Google Scholar]
  89. Ho DE 2012. Fudging the nudge: information disclosure and restaurant grading. Yale Law J 122:574–688
    [Google Scholar]
  90. Howard DH 2007. Producing organ donors. J. Econ. Perspect. 21:325–36
    [Google Scholar]
  91. Howard-Grenville JA 2006. Inside the “black box”: how organizational culture and subcultures inform interpretations and actions on environmental issues. Organ. Environ. 19:146–73
    [Google Scholar]
  92. Howard-Grenville JA, Golden-Biddle K, Irwin J, Mao J 2011. Liminality as cultural process for cultural change. Organ. Sci. 22:2522–39
    [Google Scholar]
  93. Howard-Grenville JA, Hoffman AJ 2003. The importance of cultural framing to the success of social initiatives in business. Acad. Manag. Exec. 17:270–84
    [Google Scholar]
  94. Howard‐Grenville J, Nash J, Coglianese C 2008. Constructing the license to operate: internal factors and their influence on corporate environmental decisions. Law Policy 30:173–107
    [Google Scholar]
  95. Huising R 2014. The erosion of expert control through censure episodes. Organ. Sci. 25:61633–61
    [Google Scholar]
  96. Huising R 2015. To hive or to hold? Producing professional authority through scut work. Adm. Sci. Q. 60:2263–99
    [Google Scholar]
  97. Huising R, Silbey SS 2011. Governing the gap: forging safe science through relational regulation. Regul. Gov. 5:114–42
    [Google Scholar]
  98. Huising R, Silbey SS 2013. Constructing consequences for noncompliance: the case of academic laboratories. Ann. Am. Acad. Political Soc. Sci. 649:1157–77
    [Google Scholar]
  99. Hutter RM 2001. Regulation and Risk: Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  100. Int. At. Energy Agency. 1991. Safety Culture (Safety Series 75-INSAG-4) Vienna: Austria: Int. At. Energy Agency
  101. Kagan R 2009. Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
  102. Kahan DM 1997. Social influence, social meaning, and deterrence. Va. Law Rev. 83:2349–95
    [Google Scholar]
  103. Kahan DM 1998. Social meaning and the economic analysis of crime. J. Leg. Stud. 27:S2609–22
    [Google Scholar]
  104. Kahneman D 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux
  105. Kahneman D, Tversky A 1972. Subjective probability: a judgement of representativeness. Cogn. Psychol. 3:430–54
    [Google Scholar]
  106. Kalev A 2009. Cracking the glass cages? Restructuring and ascriptive inequality at work. Am. J. Sociol. 114:61591–643
    [Google Scholar]
  107. Kalev A 2014. How you downsize is who you downsize: biased formalization, accountability, and managerial diversity. Am. Sociol. Rev. 79:1109–35
    [Google Scholar]
  108. Kalev A, Dobbin F, Kelly E 2006. Best practices or best guesses? Assessing the efficacy of corporate affirmative action and diversity policies. Am. Sociol. Rev. 71:4589–617
    [Google Scholar]
  109. Kellogg KC 2009. Operating room: relational spaces and microinstitutional change in surgery. Am. J. Sociol. 115:3657–711
    [Google Scholar]
  110. Kellogg KC 2011. Challenging Operations: Medical Reform and Resistance in Surgery Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  111. Kellogg KC 2014. Brokerage professions and implementing reform in an age of experts. Am. Sociol. Rev. 79:5912–41
    [Google Scholar]
  112. Kessler JB, Roth AE 2012. Organ allocation policy and the decision to donate. Am. Econ. Rev. 102:52018–47
    [Google Scholar]
  113. Kuhfuss L, Préget R, Thoyer S, Hanley N, Le Coent P, Désolé M 2016. Nudges, social norms and permanence in agri-environmental schemes. Land Econ 92:4641–55
    [Google Scholar]
  114. Kunda G 1992. Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press
  115. Kurz T, Donaghue N, Walker I 2005. Utilizing a social-ecological framework to promote water and energy conservation: a field experiment. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 35:61281–300
    [Google Scholar]
  116. Lepper MR, Greene D, Nisbett RE 1973. Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: a test of the “overjustification” hypothesis. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 28:1129–37
    [Google Scholar]
  117. Martinez-Moyano IJ, McCaffrey DP, Oliva R 2013. Drift and adjustment in organizational rule compliance: explaining the “regulatory pendulum” in financial markets. Organ. Sci. 25:2321–38
    [Google Scholar]
  118. May PJ 2005. Regulation and compliance motivations: examining different approaches. Public Adm. Rev. 65:131–44
    [Google Scholar]
  119. Meares TL, Kahan DM 1998. Law and (norms of) order in the city. Law Soc. Rev. 32:805–38
    [Google Scholar]
  120. Merry SE, Silbey SS 1984. What do plaintiffs want? Reexamining the concept of dispute. Justice Syst. J. 9:2151–78
    [Google Scholar]
  121. Meyerson D, Martin J 1987. Cultural change: an integration of three different views. J. Manag. Stud. 24:6623–47
    [Google Scholar]
  122. Miller GF, Gupta S, Kropp JD, Grogan KA, Mathews A 2016. The effects of pre-ordering and behavioral nudges on National School Lunch Program participants’ food item selection. J. Econ. Psychol. 55:4–16
    [Google Scholar]
  123. Morgan M, Deedat S, Kenten C 2015. “Nudging” registration as an organ donor: implications of changes in choice contexts for socio-cultural groups. Curr. Sociol. 63:5714–28
    [Google Scholar]
  124. Natl. Acad. Eng., Natl. Res. Counc. 2012. Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety Washington, DC: Natl. Acad. Press
  125. Perez-Aleman P 2013. Regulation in the process of building capabilities: strengthening competitiveness while improving food safety and environmental sustainability in Nicaragua. Politics Soc 41:4589–620
    [Google Scholar]
  126. Pernell K, Jung J, Dobbin F 2017. The hazards of expert control: chief risk officers and risky derivatives. Am. Sociol. Rev. 82:3511–41
    [Google Scholar]
  127. Peters TJ, Waterman RH, Jones I 1982. In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies New York: Harper & Row
  128. Pires RR 2011. Beyond the fear of discretion: flexibility, performance, and accountability in the management of regulatory bureaucracies. Regul. Gov. 5:143–69
    [Google Scholar]
  129. Rees J 1996. Hostages of Each Other: The Tranformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  130. Roberts MJ, Lubowski RN 2007. Enduring impacts of land retirement policies: evidence from the Conservation Reserve Program. Land Econ 83:4516–38
    [Google Scholar]
  131. Sagan SD 1993. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  132. Salganik MJ, Dodds PS, Watts DJ 2006. Experimental study of inequality and unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science 311:5762854–56
    [Google Scholar]
  133. Sandholtz KW 2013. When legitimacy becomes a constraint: lessons from an ethnographic study of human resources work PhD Diss. Stanford Univ. Stanford, CA:
  134. Sarat AD 1990. The law is all over: power, resistance and the legal consciousness of the welfare poor. Yale J. Law Humanit. 2:2343–79
    [Google Scholar]
  135. Schwartz SH 1992. Universals in the content and structure of values: theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25:1–65
    [Google Scholar]
  136. Sewell WH Jr. 2005. Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  137. Sharma S 2000. Managerial interpretations and organizational context as predictors of corporate choice of environmental strategy. Acad. Manag. J. 43:4681–97
    [Google Scholar]
  138. Short JL, Toffel MW 2010. Making self-regulation more than merely symbolic: the critical role of the legal environment. Adm. Sci. Q. 55:3361–96
    [Google Scholar]
  139. Silbey SS 2009. Taming Prometheus: talk about safety and culture. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 35:341–69
    [Google Scholar]
  140. Silbey SS 2010. Legal culture and cultures of legality. Sociology of Culture: A Handbook JR Hall, L Grindstaff, M-c Lo 470–79 Abingdon, UK: Routledge
    [Google Scholar]
  141. Silbey SS 2011. The sociological citizen: pragmatic and relational regulation in law and organizations. Regul. Gov. 5:11–13
    [Google Scholar]
  142. Silbey SS, Agrawal T 2011. The illusion of accountability: information management and organizational culture. Droit Soc 77:69–86
    [Google Scholar]
  143. Silbey SS, Huising R, Coslovsky SV 2009. The “sociological citizen” relational interdependence in law and organizations. Ann. Sociol. 59:1201–29
    [Google Scholar]
  144. Smircich L 1983. Concepts of culture and organizational analysis. Adm. Sci. Q. 28:3339–58
    [Google Scholar]
  145. Smith-Doerr L, Vardi I 2015. Mind the gap: formal ethics policies and chemical scientists’ everyday practices in academia and industry. Sci. Technol. Hum. Values 40:2176–98
    [Google Scholar]
  146. Sunstein CR, Thaler RH 2003. Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 70:41159–202
    [Google Scholar]
  147. Tal A, Wansink B 2015. An apple a day brings more apples your way: Healthy samples prime healthier choices. Psychol. Market 32:5575–84
    [Google Scholar]
  148. Talesh SA 2009. The privatization of public legal rights: how manufacturers construct the meaning of consumer law. Law Soc. Rev. 43:3527–62
    [Google Scholar]
  149. Tetlock PE 1992. The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: toward a social contingency model. Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 25:331–76
    [Google Scholar]
  150. Thaler RH, Sunstein CR 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness New York: Penguin
  151. Tiefenbeck V, Staake T, Roth K, Sachs O 2013. For better or worse? Empirical evidence of moral licensing in a behavioral energy conservation campaign. Energy Policy 57:160–71
    [Google Scholar]
  152. Transp. Res. Board. 2016. Strengthening the safety culture of the offshore oil and gas industry Spec. Rep. 321 Transp. Res. Board Washington, DC:
  153. Transp. Res. Board. 2018. Designing safety regulations for high hazard industries Spec. Rep. 324 Transp. Res. Board Washington, DC:
  154. Tversky A, Kahneman D 1973. A heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognit. Psychol. 5:2207–32
    [Google Scholar]
  155. Tversky A, Kahneman D 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211:4481453–58
    [Google Scholar]
  156. Vaughan D 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  157. Vaughan D 2003. Chapter 8: history as cause: Columbia and Challenger. Rep. Columbia Accid. Investig. Board 1:195–204
    [Google Scholar]
  158. Vogel D 1986. National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
  159. Wijland R, Hansen P, Gardezi F 2016. Mobile nudging: youth engagement with banking apps. J. Financ. Serv. Market. 21:151–63
    [Google Scholar]
  160. Willis LE 2013. When nudges fail: slippery defaults. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 80:1155–229
    [Google Scholar]
  161. Wryznewsieki A, Schwartz B, Cong X, Kane M, Omar A, Kolditz T 2014. Multiple types of motives don't multiply the motivation of West Point cadets. PNAS 111:3010990–95
    [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084716
Loading
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-110615-084716
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error