1932

Abstract

In 1978, Congress created a new federal bankruptcy law that has since become a key part of the American capital markets. I examine how large companies and their investors contract to make bankruptcy more or less likely, how distressed firms negotiate with creditors outside of bankruptcy, and how companies plan for a Chapter 11 filing and navigate the bankruptcy system. I also survey the strategic moves, ranging from litigation to financing, that activist investors deploy to improve their bargaining power and earn higher returns. The American bankruptcy system is evolving constantly, and prevailing accounts of bankruptcy law quickly become stale, creating a constant need for new empirical research to establish a foundation for policy making.

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2023-10-05
2024-04-21
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