This article considers the potential to use knowledge of expected electoral system effects to engage in electoral engineering. The review focuses on contributions made in the past dozen or so years and is limited to five specific questions: How do electoral systems affect () the proportionality of seats–votes relationships, () party proliferation, () the ideological nature of party competition, () voter turnout, and () the degree of match between the preferences of citizens and the policy choices of the government?


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