1932

Abstract

Most work on redistribution in democracies is anchored in long-standing unidimensional models, notably the seminal Meltzer-Richard-Romer model. When scholars venture outside the security of unidimensionality, many either abandon theoretical rigor or miss the full consequences of adding more dimensions (whether ideological or economic). There is now a substantial literature on redistributive politics in multidimensional policy spaces, but it tends to be very technical and frequently misinterpreted, if not ignored. This purpose of this article is to review this relatively new literature using simple graphical representations, focusing on the key assumptions, intuitions, and results. We show how issue bundling, issue salience, and the distribution of preferences can affect redistribution, and we discuss the role of political institutions in inducing particular outcomes. We also highlight the opportunities for dialogue between formal models and more constructivist approaches by exploring the effects of political entrepreneurs manipulating salience, institutions, and even identities.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031016-011009
2018-05-11
2024-04-24
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/polisci/21/1/annurev-polisci-031016-011009.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031016-011009&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Acemoglu D, Robinson JA 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  2. Aldrich JH 1983. A Downsian spatial model with party activism. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 77:4974–90
    [Google Scholar]
  3. Alesina A, Glaeser E 2004. Fighting Poverty in the U.S. and Europe. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
  4. Arrow K 1951. Social Choice and Individual Values New York: Wiley
  5. Austen-Smith D, Wallerstein M 2006. Redistribution and affirmative action. J. Public Econ. 90:Nov.1789–823
    [Google Scholar]
  6. Banks JS, Duggan J 2000. A bargaining model of collective choice. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 94:173–88
    [Google Scholar]
  7. Baron DP, Ferejohn JA 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 83:41181–206
    [Google Scholar]
  8. Becher M 2016. Endogenous credible commitment and party competition over redistribution under alternative electoral institutions. Am. J. Political Sci. 60:3768–82
    [Google Scholar]
  9. Bénabou R 1996. Inequality and growth. NBER Macroeconomics Annual BS Bernanke, JJ Rotemberg 11–73 Cambridge, MA: Natl. Bur. Econ. Res. and MIT Press
    [Google Scholar]
  10. Boix C 1999. Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 93:Sep.609–24
    [Google Scholar]
  11. Bradley DHuber E, Moller S, Nielsen F, Stephens JD. 2003. Distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies. World Politics 55:2193–228
    [Google Scholar]
  12. Budge I, Farlie D 1983. Explaining and Predicting Elections London: George Allen & Unwin
  13. Capoccia G, Ziblatt D 2010. The historical turn in democratization studies: a new research agenda for Europe and beyond. Comp. Political Stud. 43:931–68
    [Google Scholar]
  14. Chandra K 2006. What is ethnic identity and does it matter. ? Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 9:397–424
    [Google Scholar]
  15. Chong D, Druckman JN 2007.a Framing theory. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 10:103–26
    [Google Scholar]
  16. Chong D, Druckman JN 2007.b Framing public opinion in competitive democracies. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 101:Nov.637–55
    [Google Scholar]
  17. Cusack T, Iversen T, Soskice D 2007. Economic interests and the origins of electoral systems. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 101:Aug.373–91
    [Google Scholar]
  18. De La O AL, Rodden JA 2008. Does religion distract the poor? Income and issue voting around the world. Comp. Political Stud. 41:4–5437–76
    [Google Scholar]
  19. Downs A 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper
  20. Esping-Andersen G 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  21. Hall P, Gidron N 2017. The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right Presented at worksh. From Preferences to Politics in the New Economy, Nuffield College, Oxford, UK, July 15–16
  22. Huber E, Stephens JD 2001. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  23. Iversen T, Soskice D 2006. Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: why some democracies redistribute more than others. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 100:2165–82
    [Google Scholar]
  24. Kalyvas S 1996. The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
  25. Kitschelt H 1992. The formation of party systems in East-Central Europe. Political Soc 20:17–50
    [Google Scholar]
  26. Korpi W 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle London: Routledge and Kegan
  27. Korpi W 1989. Power, politics, and state autonomy in the development of social citizenship: social rights during sickness in 18 OECD countries since 1930. Am. Sociol. Rev. 54:3309–28
    [Google Scholar]
  28. Larcinese V 2007. Voting over redistribution and the size of the welfare state: the role of turnout. Pol. Stud 55:3568–85
    [Google Scholar]
  29. Lee W, Roemer JE 2006. Racism and redistribution in the United States: a solution to the problem of American exceptionalism. J. Public Econ. 90:61027–52
    [Google Scholar]
  30. Lindert PH 1996. What limits social spending. ? Explorations Econ. Hist. 33:11–34
    [Google Scholar]
  31. Lipset S, Rokkan SM 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives New York: Free Press
  32. Lupu N, Pontusson J 2011. The structure of inequality and the politics of redistribution. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 105:2316–36
    [Google Scholar]
  33. Manow P, Van Kersbergen K 2009. Religion, Class Coalitions and Welfare State Regimes Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
  34. McClain PD, Carew JDJ, Walton E Jr., Watts CS 2009. Group membership, group identity, and group consciousness: measures of racial identity in American politics. ? Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 12:471–85
    [Google Scholar]
  35. McKelvey RD 1976. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control. J. Econ. Theory 12:3472–82
    [Google Scholar]
  36. Meltzer AH, Richard SF 1981. A rational theory of the size of government. J. Political Econ. 89:914–27
    [Google Scholar]
  37. Moene KO, Wallerstein M 2001. Inequality, social insurance and redistribution. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 95:4859–74
    [Google Scholar]
  38. Monroe KR, Hankin J, Van Vechten RB 2000. The psychological foundations of identity politics. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 3:419–47
    [Google Scholar]
  39. Nelson TE, Clawson RA, Oxley ZM 1997. Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 91:3567–83
    [Google Scholar]
  40. Perotti R 1996. Growth, income distribution and democracy: what the data say. J. Econ. Growth 1:2149–87
    [Google Scholar]
  41. Pettersson‐Lidbom P 2008. Do parties matter for economic outcomes? A regression‐discontinuity approach. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 6:51037–56
    [Google Scholar]
  42. Przeworski A, Sprague J 1988. Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism Chicago: Univ. Chicago Pres
  43. Reed WR 2006. Democrats, Republicans, and taxes: evidence that political parties matter. J. Public Econ. 90:4725–50
    [Google Scholar]
  44. Riker WH 1980. Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 74:2432–46
    [Google Scholar]
  45. Riker WH 1986. The Art of Political Manipulation New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
  46. Roemer J 1998. Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb. J. Public Econ. 70:3399–424
    [Google Scholar]
  47. Roemer JE, Lee W, Van der Straeten K 2007. Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-issue Politics in Advanced Democracies Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
  48. Romer T 1975. Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax. J. Public Econ. 4:163–85
    [Google Scholar]
  49. Rubinstein A 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50:197–109
    [Google Scholar]
  50. Shayo M 2009. A model of social identity with an application to political economy: nation, class, and redistribution. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 103:2147–74
    [Google Scholar]
  51. Shepsle KA 1979. Institutional arrangements and equilibrium in multidimensional voting models. Am. J. Political Sci. 23:127–59
    [Google Scholar]
  52. Shepsle KA 2017. Rule Breaking and Political Imagination Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  53. Tavits M, Potter JD 2015. The effect of inequality and social identity on party strategies. Am. J. Political Sci. 59:3744–58
    [Google Scholar]
  54. Thelen K 1999. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2:369–404
    [Google Scholar]
  55. Wittman D 1983. Candidate motivation: a synthesis of alternative theories. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 77:142–57
    [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031016-011009
Loading
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031016-011009
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error