1932

Abstract

Scholarship on the politics of secrecy in international relations and foreign policy has experienced tremendous growth in recent years. This article begins by providing an overview of this literature, analyzing the conditions under which leaders opt for secrecy in both economic and security domains. These motivations differ greatly depending on whether the presumed audience from which a leader keeps a secret is domestic, international, or corporate in nature. Next, it considers methodological innovations and challenges, particularly in the measurement of secrecy. Finally, it reflects on the lessons learned and discusses some exciting questions that scholars could explore in future research. As a burgeoning field within international relations, the study of secrecy offers a variety of promising and potentially fruitful directions.

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2021-05-11
2024-06-14
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