1932

Abstract

Rulemaking is a critical part of American government and governance. This article reviews the political underpinnings of modern rulemaking. Specifically, it highlights the process and impact of agency regulations, as well as the key tools used by the legislature, elected executive, and courts to oversee the rulemaking process. The article also reviews who participates in the rulemaking process, as well as who influences regulatory content. Finally, new directions in regulatory policymaking are explored, including data collection advancements, as well as the potential role for guidance documents as replacements for more traditionally issued notice and comment regulations.

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2019-05-11
2024-06-25
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