Two broad traditions of scholarship can be distinguished in the vast literature on the diplomacy of conflict. The diplomatic communication tradition takes the difficulty of credible communication between adversaries as its central problem and analyzes the conditions for informative costly, costless, and inadvertent signals as well as the effects on conflict processes of these different forms of communication. A body of empirical work, focused particularly on public coercive diplomacy and alliances, also belongs to this approach. The other tradition is the rhetorical-argumentative, which focuses on rhetorical style, justificatory argument, and the effects of modes of discourse. These traditions have offered very different insights and, in some areas, complement and reinforce each other.


Article metrics loading...

Loading full text...

Full text loading...


Literature Cited

  1. Adcock F, Mosley DJ. 1975. Diplomacy in Ancient Greece London: Thames and Hudson [Google Scholar]
  2. Adler E. 2013. Constructivism in international relations: sources, contributions, and debates. Handbook of International Relations W Carlsnaes, T Risse, BA Simons 112–44 New York: Sage [Google Scholar]
  3. Aumann RJ. 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica 55:1–18 [Google Scholar]
  4. Aumann RJ, Hart S. 2003. Long cheap talk. Econometrica 71:61619–60 [Google Scholar]
  5. Ausubel LM, Cramton P, Deneckere RJ. 2002. Bargaining with incomplete information. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications 3 RJ Aumann, S Hart 1,897–1,945 Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. [Google Scholar]
  6. Baldwin DA. 1985. Economic Statecraft Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  7. Bapat NA, Kwon BR. 2015. When are sanctions effective? A bargaining and enforcement framework. Int. Organ. 69:1131–62 [Google Scholar]
  8. Barnhart JN. 2016. Status competition and territorial aggression: evidence from the scramble for Africa. Secur. Stud. In press [Google Scholar]
  9. Barston RP. 1988. Modern Diplomacy London: Longman [Google Scholar]
  10. Bátora J, Hynek N. 2014. Fringe Players and the Diplomatic Order: The “New” Heteronomy London: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  11. Baum MA. 2004. Going private: public opinion, presidential rhetoric, and the domestic politics of audience costs in US foreign policy crises. J. Confl. Resolut. 48:5603–31 [Google Scholar]
  12. Bayer R. 2006. Diplomatic exchange data set, v2006.1. http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/diplomatic-exchange
  13. Beardsley K. 2011. The Mediation Dilemma Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  14. Benson BV. 2011. Unpacking alliances: deterrent and compellent alliances and their relationship with conflict, 1816–2000. J. Polit. 73:1111–27 [Google Scholar]
  15. Benson BV. 2012. Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  16. Bercovitch JE, Rubin JZ. 1992. Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management New York: St. Martin's [Google Scholar]
  17. Berridge GR. 1995. Diplomacy: Theory and Practice London: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  18. Berridge GR. 2004. Diplomatic Classics: Selected Texts from Commynes to Vattel New York: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  19. Binmore K. 1985. Bargaining and coalitions. Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining AE Roth 269–304 London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  20. Binmore K, Rubinstein A, Wolinsky A. 1986. The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. RAND J. Econ. 17:2176–88 [Google Scholar]
  21. Bueno de Mesquita B, Smith A. 2007. Foreign aid and policy concessions. J. Confl. Resolut. 51:2251–84 [Google Scholar]
  22. Bull H. 2002. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 4th ed.. [Google Scholar]
  23. Carter DB, Stone RW. 2015. Democracy and multilateralism: the case of vote buying in the UN General Assembly. Int. Organ. 69:11–33 [Google Scholar]
  24. Cetinyan R. 2002. Ethnic bargaining in the shadow of third-party intervention. Int. Organ. 56:3645–77 [Google Scholar]
  25. Chapman TL, Wolford S. 2010. International organizations, strategy, and crisis bargaining. J. Polit. 72:1227–42 [Google Scholar]
  26. Checkel JT. 2001. Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. Int. Organ. 55:3553–88 [Google Scholar]
  27. Checkel JT, Katzenstein PJ. 2009. European Identity London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  28. Chiozza G, Goemans HE. 2004. International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still “ex post” inefficient?. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48:3604–19 [Google Scholar]
  29. Chiozza G, Goemans HE. 2011. Leaders and International Conflict London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  30. Colaresi MP, Thompson WR. 2005. Alliances, arms buildups and recurrent conflict: testing a steps-to-war model. J. Polit. 67:2345–64 [Google Scholar]
  31. Cooper AF. 1997. Beyond representation. Int. J. 53:1173–78 [Google Scholar]
  32. Cramton PC. 1992. Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty. Rev. Econ. Stud. 59:1205–25 [Google Scholar]
  33. Crawford VP. 2003. Lying for strategic advantage: rational and boundedly rational misrepresentation of identities. Am. Econ. Rev. 93:1133–49 [Google Scholar]
  34. Crawford VP, Sobel J. 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50:61431–51 [Google Scholar]
  35. Crocker CA, Hampson FO, Aall PR. 1999. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World Washington, DC: US Inst. Peace Press [Google Scholar]
  36. Dafoe A, Renshon J, Huth P. 2014. Reputation and status as motives for war. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 17:371–93 [Google Scholar]
  37. Danilovic V. 2002. When the Stakes Are High Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press [Google Scholar]
  38. Dasgupta P, Hammond P, Maskin E. 1979. The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility. Rev. Econ. Stud. 46:2185–216 [Google Scholar]
  39. Davis Cross MK. 2007. The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation from Westphalia to Maastricht New York: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  40. de Callières F. 1983 (1716). The Art of Diplomacy Lanham, MD: Univ. Press Am. [Google Scholar]
  41. Demichelis S, Weibull JW. 2008. Language, meaning, and games: a model of communication, coordination, and evolution. Am. Econ. Rev. 98:41292–311 [Google Scholar]
  42. Der Derian J. 1987. On Diplomacy: A Geneology of Western Estrangement New York: Blackwell [Google Scholar]
  43. Dixon WJ. 1996. Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement. Int. Organ. 50:4653–81 [Google Scholar]
  44. Doyle MW, Sambanis N. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  45. Dreher A, Sturm JE, Vreeland JR. 2009. Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. Eur. Econ. Rev. 53:7742–57 [Google Scholar]
  46. du Plessis AJ. 1961. The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections Madison: Univ. Wisc. Press [Google Scholar]
  47. Elliott JH. 2002. Imperial Spain 1469–1716 London: Penguin [Google Scholar]
  48. Fanis M. 2011. Secular Morality and International Security: American and British Decisions About War Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press [Google Scholar]
  49. Farrell J, Gibbons R. 1989. Cheap talk can matter in bargaining. J. Econ. Theory 48:221–37 [Google Scholar]
  50. Favretto K. 2009. Should peacemakers take sides? Major power mediation, coercion, and bias. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 103:2248–63 [Google Scholar]
  51. Fearon JD. 1994a. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 88:3577–92 [Google Scholar]
  52. Fearon JD. 1994b. Signaling versus the balance of power and interests: an empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. J. Confl. Resolut. 38:2236–69 [Google Scholar]
  53. Fearon JD. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. Int. Organ. 49:3379–414 [Google Scholar]
  54. Fearon JD. 1997. Signaling foreign policy interests: tying hands versus sinking costs. J. Confl. Resolut. 41:168–90 [Google Scholar]
  55. Fernandez R, Glazer J. 1991. Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents. Am. Econ. Rev. 81:240–52 [Google Scholar]
  56. Finnemore M, Sikkink K. 2001. Taking stock: the constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 4:1391–416 [Google Scholar]
  57. Forges F. 1990. Universal mechanisms. Econometrica 58:61341–64 [Google Scholar]
  58. Fortna VP. 2003. Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace. Int. Organ. 57:2337–72 [Google Scholar]
  59. Fortna VP. 2004. Does peacekeeping keep peace? International intervention and the duration of peace after civil war. Int. Stud. Q. 48:2269–92 [Google Scholar]
  60. Gaddis JL. 2006. The Cold War: A New History London: Penguin [Google Scholar]
  61. Gartner SS, Siverson RM. 1996. War expansion and war outcome. J. Confl. Resolut. 40:14–15 [Google Scholar]
  62. Gaubatz KT. 1996. Democratic states and commitment in international relations. Int. Organ. 50:1109–39 [Google Scholar]
  63. Gavin FJ. 2004. Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971 Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press [Google Scholar]
  64. Gerber A, Green D. 1999. Misperceptions about perceptual bias. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2:1189–210 [Google Scholar]
  65. Gibler DM. 2000. Alliances: why some cause war and why others cause peace. What Do We Know About War JA Vasquez 145–64 Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield [Google Scholar]
  66. Gibler DM, Vasquez JA. 1998. Uncovering the dangerous alliances, 1495–1980. Int. Stud. Q. 42:4785–807 [Google Scholar]
  67. Goddard SE. 2006. Uncommon ground: indivisible territory and the politics of legitimacy. Int. Organ. 60:35–68 [Google Scholar]
  68. Goddard SE. 2009. When right makes might: how Prussia overturned the European balance of power. Int. Secur. 33:3110–42 [Google Scholar]
  69. Goddard SE. 2015. The rhetoric of appeasement: Hitler's legitimation and British foreign policy, 1938–39. Secur. Stud. 24:195–130 [Google Scholar]
  70. Goldstein A. 2000. Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  71. Gottfried M, Trager R. 2016. A preference for war: how fairness and rhetoric influence leadership incentives in crises. Int. Stud. Q. In press [Google Scholar]
  72. Grigoryan A. 2010. Third-party intervention and the escalation of state-minority conflicts. Int. Stud. Q. 54:41143–74 [Google Scholar]
  73. Guisinger A, Smith A. 2002. Honest threats: the interaction of reputation and political institutions in international crises. J. Confl. Resolut. 46:2175–200 [Google Scholar]
  74. Hall T, Yarhi-Milo K. 2012. The personal touch: leaders' impressions, costly signaling, and assessments of sincerity in international affairs. Int. Stud. Q. 56:3560–573 [Google Scholar]
  75. Hamilton K, Langhorne R. 1995. The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration. Oxford, UK: Routledge [Google Scholar]
  76. Holmes M. 2013. The force of face-to-face diplomacy: mirror neurons and the problem of intentions. Int. Organ. 67:4829–61 [Google Scholar]
  77. Horowitz MC, Levendusky MS. 2012. The (non-) partisan logic of audience costs. J. Polit. 74:2323–38 [Google Scholar]
  78. Horowitz MC, Stam AC. 2014. How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. Int. Organ. 68:3527–59 [Google Scholar]
  79. Hurd I. 2015. International law and the politics of diplomacy. Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics OJ Sending, V Pouliot, IB Neumann 31–54 London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  80. Huth P. 1988a. Extended deterrence and the outbreak of war. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 82:2423–43 [Google Scholar]
  81. Huth P. 1988b. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  82. Huth P, Russett B. 1984. Testing deterrence theory: rigor makes a difference. World Polit. 42:4270–90 [Google Scholar]
  83. Huth PK. 1999. Deterrence and international conflict: empirical findings and theoretical debates. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2:25–48 [Google Scholar]
  84. Ikenberry GJ. 2008. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  85. Jervis R. 1970. The Logic of Images in International Relations New York: Columbia Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  86. Jervis R. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  87. Jervis R. 1989. Rational deterrence: theory and evidence. World Politics 41:183–207 [Google Scholar]
  88. Jervis R. 1994. What do we want to deter and how do we deter it?. Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy B Ederington, MJ Mazarr 122–24 Boulder, CO: Westview [Google Scholar]
  89. Jervis R. 1997. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  90. Jervis R, Lebow RN, Stein JG. 1985. Psychology and Deterrence Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  91. Johnston AI. 2001. Treating international institutions as social environments. Int. Stud. Q. 45:4487–515 [Google Scholar]
  92. Jönsson C, Hall M. 2005. Essence of diplomacy New York: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  93. Kagotani K, Trager RF. 2008. Recovering tarnished reputations and shared understandings in international politics Presented at Annu. Meet. Midwest Polit. Sci. Assoc., Apr. 3–6, Chicago [Google Scholar]
  94. Kahneman D. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux [Google Scholar]
  95. Kahneman D, Renshon J. 2007. Why hawks win. Foreign Policy 158:34–38 [Google Scholar]
  96. Karsten P, Howell PD, Allen AF. 1984. Military Threats: A Systematic Historical Analysis of the Determinants of Success Westport, CT: Greenwood [Google Scholar]
  97. Kertzer JD, Brutger R. 2016. Decomposing audience costs: bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 601234–49 [Google Scholar]
  98. Khong YF. 1992. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  99. Kissinger H. 1994. Diplomacy New York: Simon & Schuster [Google Scholar]
  100. Koremenos B. 2005. Contracting around international uncertainty. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99:4549–65 [Google Scholar]
  101. Koremenos B, Lipson C, Snidal D. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. Int. Organ. 55:4761–99 [Google Scholar]
  102. Krebs RR, Jackson PT. 2007. Twisting tongues and twisting arms: the power of political rhetoric. Eur. J. Int. Relat. 13:135–66 [Google Scholar]
  103. Kuperman AJ. 2008. The moral hazard of humanitarian intervention: lessons from the Balkans. Int. Stud. Q. 52:149–80 [Google Scholar]
  104. Kurizaki S. 2007. Efficient secrecy: public versus private threats in crisis diplomacy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 101:3543–58 [Google Scholar]
  105. Kurizaki S, Whang T. 2015. Detecting audience costs in international disputes. Int. Org. 69:4949–80 [Google Scholar]
  106. Kuziemko I, Werker E. 2006. How much is a seat on the security council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. J. Polit. Econ. 114:5905–30 [Google Scholar]
  107. Kydd A. 1997. Sheep in sheep's clothing: why security seekers do not fight each other. Sec. Stud. 7:1114–55 [Google Scholar]
  108. Kydd A. 2003. Which side are you on? Bias, credibility, and mediation. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47:4597–611 [Google Scholar]
  109. Kydd A. 2005. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  110. Kydd AH. 2006. When can mediators build trust?. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 100:3449–62 [Google Scholar]
  111. Kydd AH. 2010. Rationalist approaches to conflict prevention and resolution. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 13:101–21 [Google Scholar]
  112. Kydd AH, Straus S. 2013. The road to hell? Third-party intervention to prevent atrocities. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 57:3673–84 [Google Scholar]
  113. Larson DW. 1994. The role of belief systems and schemas in foreign policy decision-making. Polit. Psychol. 15:117–33 [Google Scholar]
  114. Larson DW. 2000. Anatomy of Mistrust: US-Soviet Relations During the Cold War Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  115. Lebow RN, Stein JG. 1989. Rational deterrence: I think, therefore I deter. World Polit. 41:2208–24 [Google Scholar]
  116. Leeds BA. 1999. Domestic political institutions, credible commitments, and international cooperation. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 43:4979–1002 [Google Scholar]
  117. Leeds BA. 2003. Do alliances deter aggression? The influence of military alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47:3427–39 [Google Scholar]
  118. Leeds BA, Davis DR. 1997. Domestic political vulnerability and international disputes. J. Confl. Resolut. 41:6814–34 [Google Scholar]
  119. Leeds BA, Mattes M. 2007. Alliance politics during the Cold War: aberration, new world order, or continuation of history?. Conflict Manag. Peace Sci. 24:3183–99 [Google Scholar]
  120. Lektzian DJ, Sprecher CM. 2007. Sanctions, signals, and militarized conflict. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51:2415–31 [Google Scholar]
  121. Levenotoğlu B, Tarar A. 2005. Prenegotiation public commitment in domestic and international bargaining. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99:3419–33 [Google Scholar]
  122. Levenotoğlu B, Tarar A. 2008. Does private information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining?. Int. Stud. Q. 52:533–53 [Google Scholar]
  123. Levy JS. 2012. Coercive threats, audience costs, and case studies. Secur. Stud. 21:3383–90 [Google Scholar]
  124. Levy JS, Mabe WF. 2004. Politically motivated opposition to war. Int. Stud. Rev. 6:465–84 [Google Scholar]
  125. Lewis J, Schultz K. 2003. Revealing preferences: empirical estimation of a crisis bargaining game with incomplete information. Polit. Anal. 11:4345–67 [Google Scholar]
  126. Lind J. 2011. Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  127. Long WJ, Brecke P. 2003. War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  128. Maoz Z. 1983. Resolve, capabilities, and the outcomes of interstate disputes, 1816–1976. J. Confl. Resolut. 27:2195–229 [Google Scholar]
  129. Maoz Z. 2000. Normal science and open questions: reflections on the study of peace and war, 2001–2011. What Do We Know About War JA Vasquez 271–80 Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield [Google Scholar]
  130. McDermott R, Cowden JA, Rosen S. 2008. The role of hostile communications in a crisis simulation game. Peace Confl. 14:2151–68 [Google Scholar]
  131. Mearsheimer JJ. 1994. The false promise of international institutions. Int. Secur. 19:35–49 [Google Scholar]
  132. Milner HV. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  133. Milner HV, Tingley D. 2013. The choice for multilateralism: foreign aid and American foreign policy. Rev. Int. Organ. 8:3313–41 [Google Scholar]
  134. Mitzen J. 2005. Reading Habermas in anarchy: multilateral diplomacy and global public spheres. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99:3401–17 [Google Scholar]
  135. Morrow JD. 1994. Alliances, credibility, and peacetime costs. J. Confl. Resolut. 38:270–97 [Google Scholar]
  136. Morrow JD. 2000. Alliances: Why write them down?. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 3:163–83 [Google Scholar]
  137. Mosse W. 1958. The European powers and the German question: 1848–71 London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  138. Müller H. 2004. Arguing, bargaining and all that: communicative action, rationalist theory and the logic of appropriateness in international relations. Eur. J. Int. Relat. 10:3395–435 [Google Scholar]
  139. Murray S. 2008. Consolidating the gains made in diplomatic studies: a taxonomy. Int. Stud. Perspect. 9:121–39 [Google Scholar]
  140. Muthoo A. 1990. Bargaining without commitment. Games Econ. Behav. 2:291–97 [Google Scholar]
  141. Muthoo A. 1999. Bargaining Theory with Applications Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  142. Myerson RB. 1979. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47:161–73 [Google Scholar]
  143. Myerson RB. 1986. Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54:2323–58 [Google Scholar]
  144. Myerson RB. 1991. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  145. Nicolson H. 1954. The Evolution of Diplomatic Method London: Constable [Google Scholar]
  146. Nicolson H. 1963. Diplomacy London: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  147. Nisbett RE, Cohen D. 1996. Culture of Honor: The Psychology of Violence in the South Boulder, CO: Westview [Google Scholar]
  148. O'Neill B. 1999. Honor, Symbols, and War Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press [Google Scholar]
  149. O'Neill B. 2003. Mediating national honour: lessons from the era of dueling. J. Inst. Theor. Econ. 159:1229–47 [Google Scholar]
  150. Parker G. 2000. The Grand Strategy of Philip II New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  151. Powell R. 1988. Nuclear brinkmanship with two-sided incomplete information. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 82:1155–78 [Google Scholar]
  152. Powell R. 1996. Bargaining in the shadow of power. Games Econ. Behav. 15:255–89 [Google Scholar]
  153. Powell R. 2002. Bargaining theory and international conflict. Am. Rev. Polit. Sci. 5:1–30 [Google Scholar]
  154. Powell R. 2004a. Bargaining and learning while fighting. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 48:2344–61 [Google Scholar]
  155. Powell R. 2004b. The inefficient use of power: costly conflict with complete information. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98:2231–41 [Google Scholar]
  156. Powell R. 2006. War as a commitment problem. Int. Organ. 60:1169–203 [Google Scholar]
  157. Ramsay KW. 2004. Politics at the water's edge: crisis bargaining and electoral competition. J. Confl. Resolut. 48:4459–86 [Google Scholar]
  158. Ramsay KW. 2011. Cheap talk diplomacy, voluntary negotiations, and variable bargaining power. Int. Stud. Q. 55:1003–23 [Google Scholar]
  159. Rathbun BC. 2014. Diplomacy's Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  160. Rathbun BC, Kertzer JD, Paradis M. 2015. Homo diplomaticus: Mixed-method evidence of variation in strategic rationality Work. pap., Univ. Southern Calif. [Google Scholar]
  161. Rauchhaus RW. 2006. Asymmetric information, mediation, and conflict management. World Polit. 58:2207–41 [Google Scholar]
  162. Risse T. 2000. Let's argue! Communicative action in world politics. Int. Organ. 54:11–39 [Google Scholar]
  163. Risse T. 2010. A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  164. Rosendorff BP. 2005. Stability and rigidity: politics and design of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 99:3389–400 [Google Scholar]
  165. Rubinstein A. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50:97–110 [Google Scholar]
  166. Russett BM. 1963. The calculus of deterrence. J. Confl. Resolut. 7:97–109 [Google Scholar]
  167. Sartori AE. 2002. The might of the pen: a reputational theory of communication in international disputes. Int. Organ. 56:1121–49 [Google Scholar]
  168. Sartori AE. 2005. Deterrence by Diplomacy Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  169. Satow EM. 1922. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice 1 London: Longmans Green [Google Scholar]
  170. Schelling TC. 1966. Arms and Influence New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  171. Schroeder PW. 1996. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  172. Schultz K. 2001. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  173. Schultz KA. 2012. Why we needed audience costs and what we need now. Secur. Stud. 21:3369–75 [Google Scholar]
  174. Sechser TS. 2010. Goliath's curse: coercive threats and asymmetric power. Int. Organ. 64:4627–60 [Google Scholar]
  175. Sending OJ. 2015. Diplomats and humanitarians in crisis governance. Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics OJ Sending, V Pouliot, IB Neumann 256–83 London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  176. Sending OJ, Pouliot V, Neumann IB. 2015. Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  177. Sharp P. 1997. Who needs diplomats? The problems of diplomatic representation. Int. J. 52:4609–34 [Google Scholar]
  178. Sharp P. 1999. For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations. Int. Stud. Rev. 1:133–57 [Google Scholar]
  179. Sharp P. 2009. Diplomatic Theory of International Relations 111 London: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  180. Signorino CS. 1999. Strategic interaction and the statistical analysis of international conflict. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 93:2279–97 [Google Scholar]
  181. Signorino CS, Tarar A. 2006. A unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 50:3586–605 [Google Scholar]
  182. Siverson RM, Tennefoss MR. 1984. Power, alliance, and the escalation of international conflict, 1815–1965. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 78:41057–69 [Google Scholar]
  183. Slantchev BL. 2003. The power to hurt: costly conflict with completely informed states. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 47:1123–35 [Google Scholar]
  184. Slantchev BL. 2012. Audience cost theory and its audiences. Secur. Stud. 21:3376–82 [Google Scholar]
  185. Smith A. 1995. Alliance formation and war. Int. Stud. Q. 39:4405–25 [Google Scholar]
  186. Smith A. 1996. Diversionary foreign policy in democratic systems. Int. Stud. Q. 40:1133–53 [Google Scholar]
  187. Smith A. 1998a. Extended deterrence and alliance politics. Int. Interact. 24:4315–43 [Google Scholar]
  188. Smith A. 1998b. International crises and domestic politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 92:3623–38 [Google Scholar]
  189. Smith A, Stam A. 2003. Mediation and peacekeeping in a random walk model of civil and interstate war. Int. Stud. Rev. 5:4115–35 [Google Scholar]
  190. Snyder GH. 1997. Alliance Politics Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  191. Snyder GH, Diesing P. 1977. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  192. Snyder J, Borghard ED. 2011. The cost of empty threats: a penny, not a pound. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 105:3437–56 [Google Scholar]
  193. Stein AA. 2000. The justifying state: why anarchy doesn't mean no excuses. Peace, Prosperity, and Politics J Mueller 235–55 Boulder, CO: Westview [Google Scholar]
  194. Stein JG. 1991. Reassurance in international conflict management. Polit. Sci. Q. 106:3431–51 [Google Scholar]
  195. Talbott S. 2003. The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy New York: Random House [Google Scholar]
  196. Tarar A, Leventoğlu B. 2009. Public commitment in crisis bargaining. Int. Stud. Q. 53:3817–39 [Google Scholar]
  197. Thucydides 1989. The Peloponnesian War Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  198. Tomz M. 2007. Domestic audience costs in international relations: an experimental approach. Int. Organ. 61:4821–40 [Google Scholar]
  199. Trachtenberg M. 1999. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  200. Trachtenberg M. 2008. The United States and Eastern Europe in 1945: a reassessment. J. Cold War Stud. 10:494–132 [Google Scholar]
  201. Trachtenberg M. 2012. Audience costs: an historical analysis. Secur. Stud. 21:13–42 [Google Scholar]
  202. Trager R. 2010. Diplomatic calculus in anarchy: how communication matters. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 104:2347–68 [Google Scholar]
  203. Trager RF. 2011. Multi-dimensional diplomacy. Int. Organ. 65:469–506 [Google Scholar]
  204. Trager RF. 2012. Long-term consequences of aggressive diplomacy: European relations after Austrian Crimean War threats. Secur. Stud. 21:2232–65 [Google Scholar]
  205. Trager RF. 2013. How the scope of a demand conveys resolve. Int. Theory 5:3414–45 [Google Scholar]
  206. Trager RF. 2015a. Diplomacy: communication and the origins of international order Unpublished manuscript [Google Scholar]
  207. Trager RF. 2015b. Diplomatic signaling among multiple states. J. Polit. 77:3635–47 [Google Scholar]
  208. Trager RF, Vavreck L. 2011. The political costs of crisis bargaining: presidential rhetoric and the role of party. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 55:3526–45 [Google Scholar]
  209. Voeten E. 2004. Resisting the lonely superpower: responses of states in the United Nations to US dominance. J. Polit. 66:3729–54 [Google Scholar]
  210. Watson A. 1982. Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States London: Eyre Methuen [Google Scholar]
  211. Weeks JL. 2008. Autocratic audience costs: regime type and signaling resolve. Int. Organ. 62:135–64 [Google Scholar]
  212. Weiss JC. 2013. Authoritarian signaling, mass audiences, and nationalist protest in China. Int. Organ. 67:11–35 [Google Scholar]
  213. Wendt A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  214. Werner S. 2000. Deterring intervention: the stakes of war and third-party involvement. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 44:4720–32 [Google Scholar]
  215. Whang T, McLean EV, Kuberski DW. 2013. Coercion, information, and the success of sanction threats. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 57:165–81 [Google Scholar]
  216. Wiseman G. 2011. Bringing diplomacy back in: time for theory to catch up with practice. Int. Stud. Rev. 13:710–13 [Google Scholar]
  217. Wolford S. 2014. Showing restraint, signaling resolve: coalitions, cooperation, and crisis bargaining. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 58:1144–56 [Google Scholar]
  218. Xenophon 1907. Hellenica Oxford, UK: Clarendon [Google Scholar]
  219. Yarhi-Milo K. 2013. Tying hands behind closed doors: the logic and practice of secret reassurance. Secur. Stud. 22:3405–35 [Google Scholar]
  220. Zartman IW. 1989. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  221. Zartman IW, Faure GO. 2005. Escalation and Negotiation in International Conflicts New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error