1932

Abstract

What role do business leaders play in American democracy? The dominant narrative in political science holds that business leaders have disproportionate influence; this influence has increased over time; the public opposes business engagement in politics; and a reform agenda could counteract business influence. I contrast this narrative with a second narrative that also emerges from the literature: Business leaders are fragmented and fail to achieve many of their goals; their power has weakened over time; the public wants more business engagement with politics, not less; and no viable reform agenda would fundamentally alter business power. The juxtaposed narratives reveal several insights, including a profound ambivalence among the public about the role of business in democracy. Survey evidence confirms that Democrats in particular are both especially opposed to and especially supportive of business engagement in politics, indicative of the veracity of the competing narratives.

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2023-06-15
2024-10-08
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