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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 19, 2016

The Governance of International Finance

Abstract

Contemporary international finance raises important questions about whether, and how, it might be overseen by national governments and international institutions. Inasmuch as global financial stability is a global public good, there is a normative case for governance structures to try to achieve this goal—whether they take the form of interstate cooperation or international institutions. This, however, does not mean that national states will necessarily be willing or able to work together to provide this global public good, as the incentives to free-ride are enormous. Nonetheless, the past 25 years do indicate that there has been some movement toward the provision of such global public goods as financial harmonization and a semblance of global lender-of-last-resort facilities. The record is spotty, but the trend appears to be in the direction of more global governance of global finance.

Keyword(s): global governance, international externalities, international finance, monetary cooperation
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2016-05-11
2025-06-14
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