Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield

Literature Cited

1. Aksoy D, Carter DB, Wright J 2015. Terrorism and the fate of dictators. World Politics 67:3423–68
   [Google Scholar]
2. Albrecht H, Eibl F 2018. How to keep officers in the barracks: causes, agents, and types of military coups. Int. Stud. Q. 62:1315–28
   [Google Scholar]
3. Albrecht H, Ohl D 2016. Exit, resistance, loyalty: military behavior during unrest in authoritarian regimes. Perspect. Politics 14:138–52
   [Google Scholar]
4. Allen NDF 2018. Assessing a decade of U.S. military strategy in Africa. Orbis 62:4655–69
   [Google Scholar]
5. Atkinson C 2006. Constructivist implications of material power: military engagement and the socialization of states, 1972–2000. Int. Stud. Q. 50:3509–37
   [Google Scholar]
6. Avant D 1994. Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
   [Google Scholar]
7. Avant D 1996–1997. Are the reluctant warriors out of control?. Secur. Stud. 6:251–90
   [Google Scholar]
8. Bacevich A 2007. Elusive bargain: the pattern of U.S. civil–military relations since World War II. Long War: A History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II A Bacevich 207–65 New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
   [Google Scholar]
9. Bacevich A 2013. The New American Militarism New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd ed..
   [Google Scholar]
10. Barany Z 2012. The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
11. Barany Z 2016. How Armies Respond to Revolutions and Why Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
12. Belkin A, Schofer E 2003. Toward a structural understanding of coup risk. J. Confl. Resolut. 47:5594–620
    [Google Scholar]
13. Bell C 2016. Coup d'état and democracy. Comp. Political Stud. 49:91167–200
    [Google Scholar]
14. Bell C, Sudduth JK 2017. The causes and outcomes of coup during civil war. J. Confl. Resolut. 61:71432–455
    [Google Scholar]
15. Bellin E 2012. Reconsidering the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: lessons from the Arab Spring. Comp. Politics 44:2127–49
    [Google Scholar]
16. Betts RK 1991 (1977). Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises New York: Columbia Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
17. Biddle S, Zirkle R 1996. Technology, civil-military relations, and warfare in the developing world. J. Strateg. Stud. 19:2171–212
    [Google Scholar]
18. Blankshain J, Cohn L, Kriner D 2017. Was Abrams wrong? The political costs of military mobilization Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Nov. 3–5 Reston, VA:
    [Google Scholar]
19. Böhmelt T, Clayton G 2017. Auxillary force structure: paramilitary forces and progovernment militias. Comp. Political Studies 51:2197–237
    [Google Scholar]
20. Böhmelt T, Pilster U 2015. The impact of institutional coup-proofing on coup attempts and coup outcomes. Int. Interact. 41:158–82
    [Google Scholar]
21. Bou Nassif H 2015a. Generals and autocrats: how coup-proofing predetermined the military elite's behavior in the Arab Spring. Political Sci. Q. 130:2245–75
    [Google Scholar]
22. Bou Nassif H 2015b. A military besieged: the armed forces, the police and the party in Bin ‘Ali's Tunisia, 1987–2011. Int. J. Middle East Stud. 47:165–87
    [Google Scholar]
23. Brooks R 1998. Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes Adelphi Paper 324 New York: Oxford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
24. Brooks R 2006. An autocracy at war: explaining Egypt's military effectiveness, 1967 and 1973. Secur. Stud. 15/3:July–Sept.396–430
    [Google Scholar]
25. Brooks R 2008. Shaping Strategy: The Civil–Military Politics of Strategic Assessment Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
26. Brooks R 2009. Militaries and political activity in democracies. 2009213–39
27. Brooks R 2013. Abandoned at the palace: why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime in January 2011. J. Strateg. Stud. 36:2205–20
    [Google Scholar]
28. Brooks R 2016. How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon New York: Simon & Schuster
    [Google Scholar]
29. Brooks R 2017. Military defection and the Arab Spring. Oxf. Res. Encycl. Politics Feb. 27. Retrieved Dec. 21, 2018. http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-26
    [Google Scholar]
30. Bruneau TD 2013. Impediments to the accurate conceptualization of civil–military relations. The Routledge Handbook of Civil–Military Relations T Bruneau, FC Matei 13–21 London: Routledge
    [Google Scholar]
31. Bruneau TD, Tollefson SD 2006. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil–Military Relations Austin, TX: Univ. Texas Press
    [Google Scholar]
32. Burbach DT 2019. Partisan dimensions of confidence in the U.S. military, 1973–2016. Armed Forces Soc 45:2211–33
    [Google Scholar]
33. Burk J 2001. The military's presence in American society, 1950–2000. See Feaver & Kohn 2001247–73
34. Carey S, Colaresi MP, Mitchell NJ 2016. Risk mitigation, regime security, and militias: beyond coup-proofing. Int. Stud. Q. 60:59–72
    [Google Scholar]
35. Castillo J 2014. Endurance in War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
36. Caverley JD, Savage JD 2017. When human capital threatens the Capitol: foreign aid in the form of military training and coups. J. Peace Res. 54:4542–57
    [Google Scholar]
37. Cohen EA 2002. Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime New York: Simon & Schuster
    [Google Scholar]
38. Cook S 2007. Ruling, But Not Governing Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
39. Cortright D 2005. Soldiers in Revolt: GI Resistance During the Vietnam War Chicago: Haymarket Books
    [Google Scholar]
40. Croissant A, Kuehn D, Chambers P, Wolf SO 2010. Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. Democratization 17:5950–75
    [Google Scholar]
41. Davidson J 2013. The contemporary presidency: civil–military friction and presidential decision-making: explaining the broken dialogue. Presidential Stud. Q. 43:1129–45
    [Google Scholar]
42. De Bruin E 2018. Preventing coups d'état: how counterbalancing works. J. Confl. Resolut. 62:71433–58
    [Google Scholar]
43. Decaulo S 1989. Modalities of civil–military stability in Africa. J. Modern Afr. Stud. 27:4547–78
    [Google Scholar]
44. Dempsey JK 2010. Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil–Military Relations Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
45. Desch MC 1999. Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
46. Desch MC 2001. Explaining the gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the end of the mass army. 2001289–325
47. Fallows J 2015. The tragedy of the American military. Atlantic Jan./Feb. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/
    [Google Scholar]
48. Feaver PD 1999. Civil–military relations. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 2:211–41
    [Google Scholar]
49. Feaver PD 2003. Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
50. Feaver PD 2016. Civil–military relations and policy: a sampling of a new wave of scholarship. J. Strateg. Stud. 40:1/2325–42
    [Google Scholar]
51. Feaver PD, Gelpi C 2005. Choosing Your Battles: American Civil–Military Relations and the Use of Force Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
52. Feaver PD, Hikotani T, Narine S 2005. Civilian control and civil–military gaps in the United States, Japan and China. Asian Perspect 29:1233–71
    [Google Scholar]
53. Feaver PD, Kohn RH 2001. Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil–Military Gap and American National Security Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
    [Google Scholar]
54. Finer SE 1962. The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics London: PallMall
    [Google Scholar]
55. Fordham B 2001. Military interests and civilian politics: the influence of the civil–military gap on peacetime military policy. 2001327–61
56. Gassebner M, Gutman J, Voigt S 2016. When to expect a coup d'etat? An extreme bounds analysis of coup determinants. Public Choice 169:3293–313
    [Google Scholar]
57. Glassmeyer K, Sambanis N 2008. Rebel–military integration and civil war termination. J. Peace Res. 43:3365–84
    [Google Scholar]
58. Golby J, Karlin M 2018. Why “best military advice” is bad for the military—and worse for civilians. Orbis 68:1137–53
    [Google Scholar]
59. Golby J, Feaver PD, Dropp K 2017. Elite military cues and public opinion about the use of military force. Armed Forces Soc 44:144–71
    [Google Scholar]
60. Greitens S 2016. Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
61. Grewal S 2019. Military defection during localized protests: the case of Tataouine. Int. Stud. Q. In press
    [Google Scholar]
62. Harkness KA 2016. The ethnic army and the state: explaining coup traps and the difficulties of democratization in Africa. J. Confl. Resolut. 60:4587–616
    [Google Scholar]
63. Harkness KA 2017. Military loyalty and the failure of democratization in Africa. Democratization 24:5801–28
    [Google Scholar]
64. Hunter W 1998. Negotiating civil–military relations in post-authoritarian Argentina and Chile. Int. Stud. Q. 42:2295–317
    [Google Scholar]
65. Huntington SP 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
66. Huntington SP 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in Changing Societies Norman, OK: Univ. Oklahoma Press
    [Google Scholar]
67. Janowitz M 1960. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait Glencoe, IL: Free Press
    [Google Scholar]
68. Johnson PL 2017. Virtuous shirking: social identity, military recruitment, and unwillingness to repress PhD Diss. Univ. Calif. Davis Davis, CA:
    [Google Scholar]
69. Johnson PL, Thurber C 2017. The security force ethnicity project: introducing a new dataset. Conflict Manag. Peace Sci. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0738894217709012
    [Google Scholar]
70. Kandil H 2012. Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen. Egypt's Road to Revolt Brooklyn, NY: Verso
    [Google Scholar]
71. Ketchley N 2017. Egypt in a Time of Revolution Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
72. Kohn RH 1994. Out of control: the crisis of civil–military relations. Natl. Interest 35:3–17
    [Google Scholar]
73. Kriner DL 2010. After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents and the Politics of Waging War Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
    [Google Scholar]
74. Kurlantzick J 2018. People abroad are asking their militaries to save their democracies. It won't work. Washington Post Apr. 13:201
    [Google Scholar]
75. Lagasse P, Saideman SM 2017. Public critic or secretive monitor: party objectives and legislative oversight of the military in Canada. West Eur. Politics 40:1119–38
    [Google Scholar]
76. Lee CA 2015. The politics of military operations PhD Diss. Stanford Univ. Stanford, CA:
    [Google Scholar]
77. Lee T 2015. Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
78. Liebert H, Golby J 2017. Midlife crisis? The all-volunteer force at 40. Armed Forces Soc 43:1115–38
    [Google Scholar]
79. Lupton D 2017. Out of the service, into the House: military experience and congressional war oversight. Political Res. Q. 70:2327–39
    [Google Scholar]
80. Mahoney-Norris KA 2008. The retired officer and the state. Inside Defense: Understanding the U.S. Military in the 21^st Century DS Reveron, JH Stiehm 205–20 New York: Palgrave Macmillan
    [Google Scholar]
81. Marinov N, Goemans H 2014. Coups and democracy. Br. J. Political Sci. 44:4799–825
    [Google Scholar]
82. McLauchlin T 2010. Loyalty strategies and military defection in rebellion. Comp. Politics 42:3333–50
    [Google Scholar]
83. McLauchlin T, La Parra-Perez A 2018. Disloyalty and logics of fratricide in civil war: executions of officers in Republican Spain, 1936–1939. Comp. Political Stud. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414018774373
    [Google Scholar]
84. McMahon RB, Slanchev B 2015. The guardianship dilemma: regime security through and from the armed forces. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 109:2297–313
    [Google Scholar]
85. Milner HV, Tingley D 2015. Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
86. Morency-Laflamme J 2018. A question of trust: military defection during regime crises in Benin and Togo. Democratization 25:3464–80
    [Google Scholar]
87. N'Diaye B 2001. Ivory Coast's civilian control strategies 1961–1998: a critical assessment. J. Political Mil. Sociol. 28:2246–70
    [Google Scholar]
88. Nielsen SC, Snider DM 2009. American Civil–Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
89. Nordlinger EA 1977. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
    [Google Scholar]
90. O'Donnell GA, Schmitter P, Whitehead L 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
91. Owens M 2011. U.S. Civil–Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil–Military Bargain New York: Continuum
    [Google Scholar]
92. Perlmutter A, Leogrande W 1982. The party in uniform: toward a theory of civil–military relations in communist systems. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 76:4778–89
    [Google Scholar]
93. Pilster U, Böhmelt T 2011. Coup-proofing and military effectiveness in interstate wars, 1967–99. Confl. Manag. Peace Sci. 28:41–20
    [Google Scholar]
94. Pilster U, Böhmelt T 2012. Do democracies engage less in coup-proofing? On the relationship between regime type and civil-military relations. Foreign Policy Anal 8:4355–72
    [Google Scholar]
95. Pion-Berlin D 1997. Through Corridors of Power: Institutions and Civil–Military Relations in Argentina University Park, PA: Pa. State Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
96. Pion-Berlin D, Esparza D, Grisham K 2012. Staying quartered: civilian uprisings and military disobedience in the twenty-first century. Comp. Political Studies 42:7230–59
    [Google Scholar]
97. Piplani V, Talmadge C 2016. When war helps civil–military relations: prolonged interstate conflict and the reduced risk of coups. J. Confl. Resolut. 60:81368–94
    [Google Scholar]
98. Posen B 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars. Cornell Stud. Secur. Aff Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
    [Google Scholar]
99. Powell JM 2012. Determinants of the attempting and outcome of coups d'état. J. Confl. Resolut. 56:61017–40
    [Google Scholar]
100. Powell JM, Thyne CL 2011. Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: a new dataset. J. Peace Res. 48:2249–59
     [Google Scholar]
101. Quinlivin J 1999. Coup-proofing: its practice and consequences in the Middle East. Int. Secur. 24:Fall131–65
     [Google Scholar]
102. Rahbek-Clemmensen J, Archer EM, Barr J, Belkin A, Guerrero M et al. 2012. Conceptualizing the civil–military gap: a research note. Armed Forces Soc 38:4669–78
     [Google Scholar]
103. Rapp WE 2015. Civil-military relations: the role of military leaders in strategy making. Parameters 45:313–26
     [Google Scholar]
104. Recchia S 2015. Reassessing the Reluctant Warriors: U.S. Civil–Military Relations and Multilateral Intervention Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
105. Ricks TE 1997. The widening gap between the military and society. Atlantic Monthly July 280:166–78
     [Google Scholar]
106. Roessler P 2016. Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup–Civil War Trap Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
107. Ruffa C, Dandeker C, Vennesson P 2013. Soldiers drawn into politics? The influence of tactics in civil–military relations. Small Wars Insurgencies 24:2322–34
     [Google Scholar]
108. Schake K, Mattis J 2016. Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military Stanford, CA: Hoover Inst. Press
     [Google Scholar]
109. Sechser T 2004. Are soldiers less war-prone than statesmen?. J. Confl. Resolut. 48:5746–74
     [Google Scholar]
110. Shields P 2017. Symposium: roundtable on the ethics of senior officer resignation in the United States. Armed Forces Soc 43:13–4
     [Google Scholar]
111. Singh N 2014. Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
112. Snider DM, Matthews LJ 2005. The Future of the Army Profession New York: McGraw-Hill Primis, 2nd ed..
     [Google Scholar]
113. Stacher J 2012. Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
114. Stepan A 1973. The new professionalism of internal warfare and military role expansion. Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Politics and Future A Stepan 47–69 New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
115. Stepan A 1988. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
116. Strachan H 1997. The Politics of the British Army Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
117. Sudduth JK 2017. Strategic logic of elite purges in dictatorships. Comp. Political Stud. 50:131768–1801
     [Google Scholar]
118. Svolik M 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
119. Talmadge C 2015. The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
120. Taylor BD 2003. Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
     [Google Scholar]
121. Thompson WR 1973. Grievances of Military Coup-Makers Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
     [Google Scholar]
122. Ulrich MP 2015. “Cashing in” stars: Does the professional ethic apply in retirement?. Strategic Stud. Q. 9:3102–25
     [Google Scholar]
123. Urben HA 2013. Party, politics and deciding what is proper: army officers' attitudes after two long wars. Orbis 57:3351–68
     [Google Scholar]
124. Van Evera S 1984. The cult of the offensive and the origins of the First World War. Int. Secur. 9:Summer58–107
     [Google Scholar]
125. Waldner D, Lust E 2018. Unwelcome change: coming to terms with democratic backsliding. Annu. Rev. Political Sci. 21:93–113
     [Google Scholar]
126. Weeks J 2012. Strongmen and straw men: authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 106:2326–47
     [Google Scholar]
127. White P 2017. Crisis and crisis generations: the long-term impact of international crises on military political participation. Secur. Stud. 26:4575–605
     [Google Scholar]
128. Wright J, Geddes B, Frantz E, Derpanopoulos G 2016. Are coups good for democracy?. Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog Feb. 22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/22/are-coups-good-for-democracy/?utm_term=.e301d1284846
     [Google Scholar]