1932

Abstract

The purpose of this review is to take stock of how party polarization affects governance in the United States. The article begins by defining polarization and discussing the means by which it can be measured. It is undeniable that the two parties have grown more sharply differentiated. Some evidence suggests that the substantive policy preferences of liberals and conservatives diverge more widely, but the case for ideological polarization in the spatial sense is not definitive. Effects on the institutional processes of US government have entailed a hardening of party divisions and a tendency toward centralization of power. Nevertheless, these more cohesive parties are not more effective than their predecessors at enacting policies or managing routine governing responsibilities. The consequences for public policy seem best characterized as “drift” (Hacker 2004, p. 246). There is little evidence that party polarization has promoted ideologically extreme policy outcomes or has systematically advantaged either liberalism or conservatism.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113747
2015-05-11
2025-02-19
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/polisci/18/1/annurev-polisci-072012-113747.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113747&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. White House. 2010. Obama's news conference to address the tax-cut plan. New York Times Jan. 7 [Google Scholar]
  2. Abraham HJ. 2008. Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of the U.S. Supreme Court Appointments from Washington to Bush II. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield [Google Scholar]
  3. Abramowitz AI. 2010. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  4. Aldrich JH. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  5. Aldrich JH, Montgomery JM, Sparks DB. 2014. Polarization and ideology: partisan sources of low dimensionality in scaled roll call analyses. Polit. Anal. 22:4435–56 [Google Scholar]
  6. Aldrich JH, Rohde DW. 2000a. The consequences of party organization in the House: the role of the majority and the minority parties in conditional party government. Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era JR Bond, R Fleisher 31–72 Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  7. Aldrich JH, Rohde DW. 2000b. The Republican revolution and the House Appropriations Committee. J. Polit. 62:1–33 [Google Scholar]
  8. Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc 1950. Toward a more responsible two-party system: a report of the committee on political parties. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 44:1–14 [Google Scholar]
  9. Bailey MA. 2007. Comparable preference estimates across time and institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51:433–48 [Google Scholar]
  10. Baumgartner FR, Berry JM, Hojnacki M, Leech BL, Kimball DC. 2009. Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  11. Beard CA. 1943. The Republic: Conversations on Fundamentals New York: Viking [Google Scholar]
  12. Berry JM. 1997. The Interest Group Society New York: Longman [Google Scholar]
  13. Binder SA. 1997. Minority Rights, Majority Rule New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  14. Binder SA. 2003. Stalemate: Causes and Consequences of Legislative Gridlock Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  15. Binder SA, Maltzman F. 2009. Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the Federal Judiciary Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  16. Binder SA, Smith SS. 1997. Politics or Principle: Filibustering in the United States Senate Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  17. Bonica A. 2014. Mapping the ideological marketplace. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 58:367–86 [Google Scholar]
  18. Brady DW, Ferejohn J, Harbridge L. 2008. Polarization and public policy: a general assessment. Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics PS Nivola, DW Brady 185–216 Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  19. Cann DM. 2008. Modeling committee chair selection in the U.S. House of Representatives. Polit. Anal. 16:274–89 [Google Scholar]
  20. Clinton J, Jackman S, Rivers D. 2004. The statistical analysis of roll call data. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98:355–70 [Google Scholar]
  21. Clinton JD. 2012. Using roll call estimates to test models of politics. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 15:79–99 [Google Scholar]
  22. Converse P. 1964. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. Ideology and Discontent DE Apter 206–61 New York: Free Press Glencoe [Google Scholar]
  23. Cooper J. 2013. The modern Congress. Congress Reconsidered, ed. BI Oppenheimer, LC Dodd 401–36 Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  24. Cooper J, Brady DW. 1981. Institutional context and leadership style: the House from Cannon to Rayburn. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 75:411–25 [Google Scholar]
  25. Cooper J, Young G. 2002. Party and preference in congressional decision making: roll call voting in the House of Representatives, 1889–1999. Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress D Brady, M McCubbins 64–106 Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  26. Covington CR. 1987. “Staying private”: gaining congressional support for unpublicized presidential preferences on roll call votes. J. Polit. 49:737–55 [Google Scholar]
  27. Cox GW, McCubbins MD. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  28. Curry JM. 2015. Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  29. Deering CJ, Wahlbeck PJ. 2006. U.S. House committee chair selection: Republicans play musical chairs in the 107th Congress. Am. Polit. Res. 34:223–42 [Google Scholar]
  30. Devins N, Baum L. 2014. Split definitive: how party polarization turned the Supreme Court into a partisan court Res. Pap. 09-276, William & Mary Law School, Williamsburg, VA [Google Scholar]
  31. Devins N, Lewis DE. 2008. Not-so independent agencies: party polarization and the limits of institutional design. Boston Univ. Law Rev. 88:459–98 [Google Scholar]
  32. Edwards GC. 1990. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  33. Edwards GC. 2003. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  34. Ellis C, Stimson JA. 2012. Ideology in America New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  35. Epstein D, O'Halloran S. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  36. Epstein L, Knight J. 1998. The Choices Justices Make Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  37. Epstein L, Landes WM, Posner RA. 2013. The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  38. Erikson RS, MacKuen MB, Stimson JA. 2002. The Macro Polity New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  39. Ethridge E. 2012. 2011 vote studies: party unity. CQ Wkly. Jan. 16:111–16 [Google Scholar]
  40. Ethridge E. 2014. 2013 vote studies: presidential support. CQ Wkly. Feb. 3:170–76 [Google Scholar]
  41. Evans CL. 2001. Committees, leaders, and message politics. Congress Reconsidered LC Dodd, BI Oppenheimer 217–43 Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  42. Evans CL, Oleszek WJ. 2002. Message politics and Senate procedure. The Contentious Senate: Partisanship, Ideology, and the Myth of Cool Judgment CC Campbell, NC Rae 107–30 New York: Rowman & Littlefield [Google Scholar]
  43. Fiorina MP, Abrams SJ. 2009. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics Norman: Univ. Okla. Press [Google Scholar]
  44. Galvin D. 2010. Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  45. Gerring J. 1998. Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996 New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  46. Gilmour JB. 1995. Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. Pittsburgh Press [Google Scholar]
  47. Green MN. 2010. The Speaker of the House: A Study of Leadership New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  48. Grimmer J. 2013. Representational Style in Congress: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  49. Groeling TJ. 2010. When Politicians Attack: Party Cohesion in the Media New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  50. Groseclose T, Levitt SD, Snyder JM Jr. 1999. Comparing interest group scores across time and chambers: adjusted ADA scores for the U.S. Congress. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 93:33–50 [Google Scholar]
  51. Grossmann M. 2014. Artists of the Possible: Governing Networks and American Policy Change Since 1945 Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  52. Grossmann M, Dominguez CBK. 2009. Party coalitions and interest group networks. Am. Polit. Res. 37:767–800 [Google Scholar]
  53. Gutmann A, Thompson DF. 2012. The Spirit of Compromise: Why Governing Demands It and Campaigning Undermines It Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  54. Hacker JS. 2004. Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: the hidden politics of social policy retrenchment in the United States. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 98:243–60 [Google Scholar]
  55. Hacker JS, Pierson P. 2005. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  56. Hacker JS, Pierson P. 2010. Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class New York: Simon & Schuster [Google Scholar]
  57. Han H, Brady DW. 2007. A delayed return to historical norms: congressional party polarization after the Second World War. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 37:505–31 [Google Scholar]
  58. Hanson PC. 2014. Abandoning the regular order: majority party influence on appropriations in the U.S. Senate. Polit. Res. Q. 67:3519–32 [Google Scholar]
  59. Harris DB. 1998. The rise of the public speakership. Polit. Sci. Q. 113:193–212 [Google Scholar]
  60. Harris DB. 2005. Orchestrating party talk: a party-based view of one-minute speeches in the House of Representatives. Legis. Stud. Q. 30:127–41 [Google Scholar]
  61. Harris DB. 2013. Let's play hardball: congressional partisanship in a television era. Politics to the Extreme: American Political Institutions in the Twenty-First Century SA Frisch, SQ Kelly 93–115 New York: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  62. Hasen RL. 2013. End of the dialogue? Political polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress. South. Calif. Law Rev. 86:2012–65 [Google Scholar]
  63. Heberlig ES, Larson BA. 2012. Congressional Parties, Institutional Ambition, and the Financing of Majority Control. Ann Arbor: Univ. Mich. Press [Google Scholar]
  64. Herrnson PS. 2009. The roles of party organizations, party-connected committees, and party allies in elections. J. Polit. 71:1207–24 [Google Scholar]
  65. Hetherington MJ. 2009. Review article: putting polarization in perspective. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 39:413–48 [Google Scholar]
  66. Howell WG. 2003. Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  67. Howell WG, Adler S, Cameron C, Riemann C. 2000. Divided government and the legislative productivity of Congress, 1945–94. Legis. Stud. Q. 25:285–312 [Google Scholar]
  68. Huntington SP. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony Cambridge, MA: Belknap [Google Scholar]
  69. Jacobson GC. 2003. Partisan polarization in presidential support: the electoral connection. Congr. Pres. 30:11–36 [Google Scholar]
  70. Jones BD, Baumgartner FR, True JL. 1998. Policy punctuations: U.S. budget authority, 1947–1995. J. Polit. 60:1–33 [Google Scholar]
  71. Jones DR. 2001. Party polarization and legislative gridlock. Polit. Res. Q. 54:125–41 [Google Scholar]
  72. Jones DR. 2014. Partisan control of government and public policy. Guide to U.S. Political Parties MR Hershey 347–57 Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  73. Kaiser RG. 2013. Act of Congress: How America's Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn't New York: Knopf [Google Scholar]
  74. Karol D. 2009. Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  75. Katznelson I. 2013. Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time New York: Liveright [Google Scholar]
  76. Kernell S. 2007. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  77. Kingdon JW. 1981. Congressmen's Voting Decisions New York: Harper & Row [Google Scholar]
  78. Koger G. 2010. Filibustering: A Political History of Obstruction in the House and Senate Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  79. Koger G, Masket S, Noel H. 2009. Partisan webs: information exchange and party networks. Br. J. Polit. Sci. 39:633–53 [Google Scholar]
  80. Krehbiel K. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  81. Kriner D, Schwartz L. 2008. Divided government and congressional investigations. Legis. Stud. Q. 33:295–321 [Google Scholar]
  82. Krutz GS. 2001. Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  83. La Raja RJ. 2013. Why super PACs: how the American party system outgrew the campaign finance system. Forum 10:91–104 [Google Scholar]
  84. Lapinski JS. 2008. Policy substance and performance in American lawmaking, 1877–1994. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 52:235–51 [Google Scholar]
  85. Lapinski JS. 2013. The Substance of Representation: Congress, American Political Development, and Lawmaking Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  86. Layman GC, Carsey TM, Green JC, Herrera R, Cooperman R. 2010. Activists and conflict extension in American party politics. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 104:324–46 [Google Scholar]
  87. Lee FE. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  88. Lee FE. 2011. Making laws and making points: Senate governance in an era of uncertain majorities. Forum 9:4 doi: 10.2202/1540-8884.1488 [Google Scholar]
  89. Lee FE. 2013. Presidents and party teams: the politics of debt limits and executive oversight, 2001–2013. Pres. Stud. Q. 43:775–91 [Google Scholar]
  90. Lewis DE. 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  91. Liptak A. 2010. A sign of the Court's polarization: choice of clerks. New York Times Sept. 6. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/us/politics/07clerks.html?pagewanted=all [Google Scholar]
  92. Malecha GL, Reagan DJ. 2012. The Public Congress: Congressional Deliberation in a New Media Age New York: Routledge [Google Scholar]
  93. Mann TE, Ornstein NJ. 2006. The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back On Track New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  94. Mann TE, Ornstein NJ. 2012. It's Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism New York: Basic Books [Google Scholar]
  95. Mansbridge J, Martin CJ. 2013. Negotiating Agreement in Politics Washington, DC: Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc. [Google Scholar]
  96. Matthews DR, Stimson JA. 1975. Yeas and Nays: Normal Decisionmaking in the U.S. House of Representatives New York: John Wiley & Sons [Google Scholar]
  97. Mayhew DR. 2005. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002 New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  98. Mayhew DR. 2010. Partisan Balance: The Presidency, the Senate, and the House Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  99. McCarty N, Poole KT, Rosenthal H. 2006. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [Google Scholar]
  100. McCarty N, Razaghian R. 1999. Advice and consent: Senate responses to executive branch nominations, 1885–1996. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 43:1122–43 [Google Scholar]
  101. Mettler S. 2014. Degrees of Inequality: How the Politics of Higher Education Sabotaged the American Dream New York: Basic Books [Google Scholar]
  102. Milkis SM. 1993. The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  103. Nathan RP. 1983. The Administrative Presidency New York: Wiley [Google Scholar]
  104. Noel H. 2013. Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  105. Oleszek WJ. 2010. Whither the role of conference committees, or is it wither?. Extension of Remarks Newsl. Legis. Stud. Sect., Am. Polit. Sci. Assoc., 33 [Google Scholar]
  106. Oleszek MJ. 2014. Collaborative relationships and lawmaking in the U.S. Senate: a perspective drawn from firsthand accounts. The Evolving Congress107–28 Comm. Rules Admin., US Senate. S. Prt. 113-30, Dec. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113SPRT89394/pdf/CPRT-113SPRT89394.pdf [Google Scholar]
  107. Oppenheimer BI. 1977. The Rules Committee: new arm of leadership in a decentralized House. Congress Reconsidered LC Dodd, BI Oppenheimer 96–116 New York: Praeger [Google Scholar]
  108. Oxford Univ. Press 2000. Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  109. Parker DCW, Dull M. 2013. The weaponization of congressional oversight: the politics of the watchful eye, 1947–2010. Politics to the Extreme: American Political Institutions in the Twenty-First Century SA Frisch, SQ Kelly 47–70 New York: Palgrave Macmillan [Google Scholar]
  110. Patashnik E. 2008. Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes Are Enacted Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  111. Pew Res. Cent 2014. Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise, and Everyday Life. Washington, DC: Pew Res. Cent http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/6-12-2014-Political-Polarization-Release.pdf [Google Scholar]
  112. Persily N. 2015. Solutions to Political Polarization in America New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  113. Polsby NW. 1978. Presidential cabinet making: lessons for the political system. Polit. Sci. Q. 93:15–25 [Google Scholar]
  114. Poole KT, Rosenthal H. 1991. Patterns of congressional voting. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 35:228–78 [Google Scholar]
  115. Poole KT, Rosenthal H. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting New York: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  116. Poole KT, Rosenthal HL. 2011. Ideology and Congress New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction [Google Scholar]
  117. Rawls WL. 2009. In Praise of Deadlock: How Partisan Struggle Makes Better Laws Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Cent. [Google Scholar]
  118. Reagan R. 1961. Radio address on socialized medicine. Am. Rhetor. Online Speech Bank. http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreagansocializedmedicine.htm [Google Scholar]
  119. Rich A. 2004. Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  120. Rigby E, Clark JH, Pelika S. 2014. Party politics and enactment of “Obamacare”: a policy-centered analysis of minority party involvement. J. Health Polit. Policy Law 39:57–95 [Google Scholar]
  121. Roberts JM. 2007. The statistical analysis of roll-call data: a cautionary tale. Legis. Stud. Q. 32:341–60 [Google Scholar]
  122. Roberts JM, Smith SS. 2003. Procedural contexts, party strategy, and conditional party voting in the U.S. House of Representatives. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 47:305–17 [Google Scholar]
  123. Rohde DW. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  124. Rosen J. 2013. Can the judicial branch be a steward in a polarized democracy?. Daedalus 42:225–35 [Google Scholar]
  125. Rossiter C. 1960. Parties and Politics in America Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  126. Schattschneider EE. 1942. Party Government New York: Farrar & Rinehart [Google Scholar]
  127. Schickler E. 2013. New Deal liberalism and racial liberalism in the mass public, 1937–1968. Perspect. Polit. 11:75–98 [Google Scholar]
  128. Schlesinger JA. 1985. The new American political party. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 79:1152–69 [Google Scholar]
  129. Segal JA, Spaeth HJ. 2002. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  130. Sellers P. 2010. Cycles of Spin: Strategic Communication in the U.S. Congress. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  131. Sinclair B. 1989. The Transformation of the U.S. Senate. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  132. Sinclair B. 1995. . Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  133. Sinclair B. 2012. Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress. Washington, DC: CQ Press [Google Scholar]
  134. Skinner RM. 2011. Barack Obama and the partisan presidency. The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties JC Green, DJ Coffey 309–22 Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield [Google Scholar]
  135. Skocpol T. 1999. Advocates without members: the recent transformation of American life. Civic Engagement in American Democracy T Skocpol, MP Fiorina 461–509 Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  136. Skocpol T. 2007. Government activism and the reorganization of American civic democracy. The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism P Pierson, T Skocpol 39–67 Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  137. Smith SS. 2007. Party Influence in Congress New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  138. Smith SS. 2014. The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate. Norman: Univ. Okla. Press [Google Scholar]
  139. Stokes DE. 1963. Spatial models of party competition. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 57:368–77 [Google Scholar]
  140. Sundquist JL. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. [Google Scholar]
  141. Teles SM. 2008. The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  142. Theriault SM. 2008. Party Polarization in Congress New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  143. Theriault SM. 2013. The Gingrich Senators Oxford, UK: Oxford Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  144. Theriault SM, Rohde DW. 2011. The Gingrich senators and party polarization in the U.S. Senate. J. Polit. 73:1011–24 [Google Scholar]
  145. Van Houweling RP. 2003. Legislators' personal policy preferences and partisan legislative organization PhD thesis, Harvard Univ. [Google Scholar]
  146. Wawro GJ, Schickler E. 2006. Filibuster: Obstruction and Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  147. Weyl B. 2014. 2013 vote studies: party unity. CQ Weekly Feb. 3 183–88 [Google Scholar]
  148. Wood BD, Waterman RW. 1991. The dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 85:801–28 [Google Scholar]
  149. Woodward CV. 1951. Origins of the New South 1877–1913 Baton Rouge: La. State Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
  150. Yalof DA. 1999. Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press [Google Scholar]
  151. Zelizer JE. 2004. On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its Consequences, 1948–2000 New York: Cambridge Univ. Press [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-113747
Loading
  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error