1932

Abstract

What state capacity is and how to strengthen it remain open questions, as the underlying incentives of the state, its citizens, and its agents align in some areas of state activity and diverge in others. This article lays out a framework that integrates classical and experimental approaches within a common theoretical structure based on the diverse capacity challenges states face with respect to extraction, coordination, and compliance. Addressing each in turn, we show that state capacity is an interactive process, the product of institutions governing relations between the state, mass publics, and bureaucrats. We argue that the institutions ensuring capacity and the processes that bring them into being vary. Our review highlights trends in recent research, as well as relevant differences in opportunities for and obstacles to empirical work on the subject.

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2018-05-11
2024-06-25
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