This review identifies empirical facts about lobbying that are generally agreed upon in the literature. It then discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges—with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference. The article then discusses the advantages, disadvantages, and effective use of the main types of data available for research in lobbying. It closes with a number of open questions for researchers in the field and avenues for future work to advance empirical research on lobbying.


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