1932

Abstract

▪ Abstract 

This review shows that a combined law, economics, and organization theory approach leads to different and deeper understandings of the purposes served by complex contract and economic organization. The business firm for these purposes is described not in technological terms (as a production function) but in organizational terms (as an alternative mode of governance). Firm and market are thus examined comparatively with respect to their capacities to organize transactions, which differ in their complexity, so as to economize on transaction costs. The predictive theory of economic organization that results has numerous ramifications for public policy toward business and for teaching and research in the law schools.

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2005-12-09
2025-02-11
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