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Abstract

▪ Abstract 

We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases. Linkages between cases can arise because of exogenous factors such as correlated culpability or damages, or they can be generated by discretionary choices on the part of the litigants themselves or by legal doctrine and rules of procedure.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115856
2005-12-09
2024-06-15
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  • Article Type: Review Article
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