1932

Abstract

▪ Abstract 

Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto bargaining and some of its more interesting and useful extensions, focusing on one of the best developed applications, the presidential veto over legislation. One of the primary attractions of these models is that they often produce crisp, testable empirical predictions. Our review focuses on 18 such predictions. We conclude with a brief review of the empirical evidence related to these hypotheses.

Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104810
2004-06-15
2024-06-15
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104810
Loading
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104810
Loading

Data & Media loading...

  • Article Type: Review Article
This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error