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Abstract

▪ Abstract 

Growing interdependence between jurisdictions means that states are increasingly using private actors as proxies in order to achieve desired regulatory outcomes. International relations theory has had difficulty in understanding the exact circumstances under which they might wish to do this. Drawing on literatures in both international relations and legal scholarship, this article proposes a framework for understanding when states will or will not use private actors as proxy regulators. This framework highlights the relationship between state preferences and the presence or absence of a “point of control,” a special kind of private actor. The article then conducts an initial plausibility probe of the framework, assessing how well it explains outcomes in the regulation of gambling, privacy, and the taxation of e-commerce.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.060804.162744
2006-06-15
2024-06-18
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  • Article Type: Review Article
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