Annual Review of Political Science - Volume 15, 2012

Kenneth Waltz's books and articles have definitively shaped the study of international relations over the past fifty years. He developed a version of “Realist” thinking on the subject that has structured research in the entire field, for critics and supporters alike. On March 11, 2011, at his home in New York, he was interviewed by James Fearon, a member of the Editorial Committee of the Annual Review of Political Science. The conversation ranged over some of his best-known arguments and the relationships between them, his thinking about contemporary international politics, and issues in the field that he thinks are understudied relative to their importance. What follows is an edited transcript of that conversation. A video of the entire conversation is available online.

This article compares government responses to the Great Recession of 2008–2009 with government responses to recessions and other economic challenges in the period 1974–1982. We focus on five countries: France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Across these countries, we observe two broad shifts in crisis responses. First, governments have in the recent period eschewed heterodox crisis policies and relied more exclusively on fiscal stimulus. Second, tax cuts have become a more important component of fiscal stimulus while spending cuts have featured more prominently in governments' efforts to consolidate their fiscal position. We argue that crisis responses reflect the interests and power of domestic actors as well as external constraints and the nature of the economic problems at hand.

Political scientists are only now beginning to come to terms with the importance of the Internet to politics. The most promising way to study the Internet is to look at the role that causal mechanisms such as the lowering of transaction costs, homophilous sorting, and preference falsification play in intermediating between specific aspects of the Internet and political outcomes. This will allow scholars to disentangle the relevant causal relationships and contribute to important present debates over whether the Internet exacerbates polarization in the United States, and whether social media helped pave the way toward the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. Over time, ever fewer political scientists are likely to study the Internet as such, as it becomes more and more a part of everyday political life. However, integrating the Internet's effects with present debates over politics, and taking proper advantage of the extraordinary data that it can provide, requires good causal arguments and attention to their underlying mechanisms.

Transatlantic international relations (IR) theory has more or less neglected the international relations of East Asia. This relative neglect has come in different forms: excluding East Asian cases from analysis, including East Asian cases but miscoding or misunderstanding them, or including them but missing the fact that they do not confirm the main findings of the study. A review of the East Asia–related literature on three important clusters of theorizing—structural theories of conflict, institutional design and efficacy, and historical memory—suggests that this neglect of the region (and other regions) may come at a cost to transatlantic IR, not only in terms of data problems but also in terms of omitted or downplayed explanatory variables and theoretical arguments.

Measuring the preferences of political elites is critically important for analyzing the determinants and consequences of elite behavior. The decisions that elites make when casting roll call votes seem to provide an ideal opportunity for measuring elite preferences and testing theories of the political process. The fact that the resulting ideal points are a consequence of applying a statistical model to a model of individual choice, however, may affect their usefulness for measuring elite preferences and testing predictions regarding individual and collective decision making. When analyzing roll call votes, scholars should be mindful of how their decisions may affect the estimates from their analyses. I use simulations to illustrate how the nonrandom selection of roll calls may affect the ability to estimate ideal points that accurately reflect the preferences responsible for generating the observed votes, and I discuss work integrating the many models involved in the production and consumption of roll call estimates.

Despite lingering ambiguity surrounding the concept, global civil society is acclaimed by those who think they belong to it, and validated by international governmental organizations seeking legitimation for their activities. Its enthusiasts believe global civil society presages a more congenial kind of politics that transcends the system of sovereign states. Its critics deride its unrepresentativeness and complicity in established power relations. The critics can be answered by more subtle accounts of representation and by highlighting contestatory practices. Appreciation of the promise and perils of global civil society requires moving beyond preconceptions rooted in dated ideas about civil society and democracy as they allegedly function within states. Irrespective of the sophistication of such post-Westphalian moves, global civil society remains contested terrain, involving interconnected political and intellectual disputes. International relations theory proves less useful than it should be in clarifying what is at stake. Democratic theory can be brought to bear, and this encounter sheds new light on what democracy itself can entail.

The philosophical literature on global distributive justice has become both more substantive and more rigorous in recent years. This article surveys some recent positions within that literature and notes that the differences between them often involve different views about the empirical facts underlying global wealth and poverty. This suggests that some headway might be gained in arguments about global justice by a greater engagement between political philosophy and empirical political science.

This essay reviews recent literature on varieties of capitalism, drawing on insights from existing studies to propose a new, more differentiated way of thinking about contemporary changes in the political economies of the rich democracies. The framework offered here breaks with the “continuum models” on which much of the traditional literature has been based, in which countries are arrayed along a single dimension according to their degree of “corporatism” or, more recently, of “coordination.” In so doing, it reveals combinations—continued high levels of equality with significant liberalization, and declining solidarity in the context of continued significant coordination—that existing theories rule out by definition. I argue that these puzzling combinations cannot be understood with reference to the usual dichotomous, structural variables on which the literature has long relied, but require instead greater attention to the coalitional foundations on which political-economic institutions rest. A coalitional approach reveals that institutions that in the past supported the more egalitarian varieties of capitalism survive best not when they stably reproduce the politics and patterns of the Golden Era but rather when they are reconfigured—in both form and function—on the basis of significantly new political support coalitions.

Theories that link domestic politics, domestic institutional structures, and leader incentives to foreign affairs have flowered in the past 25 years or so. By unpacking institutional variation across states and by drawing attention to agency issues between leaders, key backers, and citizens, models and empirical studies of linkage help explain even such fundamental phenomena between states as war and peace. In addition, theories of linkage politics explain phenomena not envisioned under earlier unitary-actor state models. We address how the linkage literature explains war and peace decisions, the democratic peace, nation building, foreign aid, and economic sanctions by tying international politics and foreign policy to domestic political considerations.

Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between policy makers and citizens. Recent theoretical work suggests that there are limits on how well this formal accountability links policy decisions to citizen preferences. In particular, incumbents' incentives are driven not by the voters' evaluation of the normative desirability of outcomes but by the outcome's information about the incumbent's type (e.g., competence or ideology). This review surveys both this body of theory and the robust empirical literature it has spawned. It concludes with a short discussion of ongoing work that attempts to integrate this theoretical perspective with a richer view of policy-making institutions.

Practitioners and politicians have long debated the wisdom of pushing countries to hold elections, with some arguing for its necessity and others warning of its futility and even danger. Yet, research on how varying types of international activities affect the conduct and structure of elections still has a long way to go to be able to inform this debate. This article discusses the myriad international forms of engagement with elections and reviews the research on their ability to improve election quality. It also explores the more nefarious international activities, which are even less well understood than the efforts to improve elections. Given the mixed outcomes and findings, much work remains to be done, especially in specifying the conditions under which various effects occur. Such work has both practical and theoretical merits and can shed light on broader scholarly inquiries about the international dimensions of democratization.

The past three decades have witnessed the development of a rich literature that applies the formal tools of game theory to understanding international cooperation and international institutions. We divide this literature into three “generations” of scholarship. With a few notable exceptions, the first generation used very simple models—2×2 normal form games—to understand why states need to cooperate and why they comply with their cooperative agreements under conditions of anarchy. This first generation unfortunately bogged down in the neorealist–neoliberal debate. Second-generation scholars began to use tailor-made models to address the neorealist–neoliberal debate and to turn to new questions, such as how international agreements are created and how domestic political divisions affect international cooperation. With answers to the key questions of how international agreements are created and complied with, third-generation scholars could turn to increasingly refined models to answer specific questions about international institutions, such as the proper size of multilateral agreements, how the gains of cooperation are distributed, whether flexibility provisions should be built into agreements, and the specific functions of international organizations.

Wrestling with basic problems of causal inference between institutions and outcomes has been a central focus of political science over the last decade, and as elsewhere in the discipline, scholars of postcommunism have begun to make some headway on these problems. Their efforts have not only advanced important debates about postcommunism, but also in many cases addressed long-standing concerns in political science. This is in itself a sign that after years on the periphery of political science prior to 1989, the study of politics and economics in postcommunist Eurasia has come in from the cold.

This article provides a roadmap for understanding the points of agreement and contention that characterize contemporary empirical scholarship on international human rights legal regimes. It explores what the statistical research teaches us about why states participate in these regimes; knowledge of how these regimes operate; and their relationship to actual human rights behavior. It also describes the central shortcomings of this research tradition and suggests a few areas especially promising for future research.

The aging of the global population, combined with changes in technology and cultural understandings of disease and the body, have thrust discussion and contestation over health into the center of local, national, and global politics. Is the politics of health different from the politics of other policy domains? On a number of dimensions, I conclude that it is. Voters and politicians in the developed world appear more likely to accept redistributive claims with respect to health than they are in other policy areas. Nations vary less widely in spending on health than on other functions of government and policy. Moral claims made about health are more likely to attach to its politics than are moral claims about the environment, labor, finance, and energy. More than these other realms, health politics encompasses issues regarding identity, the human body, and other personal matters that endow the health arena with greater significance. Bureaucratic agencies of state are more involved in the provision and regulation of health politics than in other areas, and the science-related nature of state expertise allows medical science itself to be sculpted in deeply political and administrative ways. The article concludes with reasons why political scientists should approach cross-policy generalizations cautiously, and with a call for greater engagement with health politics—to do for political science what health economics, the history of medicine, and medical sociology have done for other social science disciplines.

Although the rest of the American politics subfield has taken up many of the research challenges that LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) politics poses, there has been very little attention to LGBT politics within APD (American political development). Yet LGBT politics has deeply developmental and “state-centered” dynamics. Until the middle of the twentieth century, sexual orientation was simply not widely and deeply politicized in the United States. But abruptly, in a period of a decade and a half (roughly 1940–1955), national political and bureaucratic actors created a national sexuality regime that has taken 60 years of LGBT struggle to partly reverse. In seeking to substitute a different, overtly inclusive sexuality regime, LGBT citizens and their straight allies have initiated far-reaching changes in public policy, regulation of the workplace, and the institution of marriage. American politics has thus been developed by LGBT politics—and in the process, a fruitful research agenda has emerged.

This review examines policy feedback effects among the mass public, with a focus on social policies in the United States and Europe. It shows that existing policies feed back into the political system, shaping subsequent policy outcomes. Policies exert this effect by altering not only the capacities, interests, and beliefs of political elites and states but also those of the public. Public policies can shape political participation and attitudes. These effects can be positive or negative, enhancing or undercutting participation and conferring positive or negative messages about individuals' worth as citizens. These effects originate in elements of program design, such as the size, visibility, and traceability of benefits, the proximity of beneficiaries, and modes of program administration. Thus, public policy itself shapes the distance of citizens from government, with profound implications for democratic governance.

In the past decade, political science has witnessed a substantial amount of research using formal models to explicate the rationale for and effects of myriad aspects of bureaucratic institutions. Whereas previous waves of formal modeling on bureaucratic structure emphasized bureaucracy as a device for making policy commitments last, more recent formal research has grappled with information asymmetries and more explicitly considered the principal-agent relationship between bureaucracies and political authorities. We review several major recent themes in this literature, particularly the effects and development of bureaucratic hierarchies, the agency dilemmas inherent when policy-making authority is delegated to bureaucrats, and the effects of institutional structure on the development and sharing of expertise and capacity in bureaucracies.

In Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science (1998), Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech characterized a series of problems in the interest group research published between 1950 and 1995. In this article, we assess whether recent research has become more theoretically coherent, more attentive to context, and broader in both scope and topical focus, all of which are crucial to advancing the systematic study of interest groups and their policy-making activities. Overall, we observe more large-scale and longitudinal studies between 1996 and 2011 than Baumgartner & Leech observed between 1950 and 1995. This newer literature also is much more likely to focus on key issues for students of politics, and to give attention to the context in which organizations operate to affect public policy. However, we see minimal evidence that scholars addressing similar questions within the subfield are operating from one or a few shared theoretical frameworks.

The spatial model of elections identifies factors that motivate party elites to shift their policy positions, including changes in voters' policy preferences, rival parties' policy shifts, past election results, and changes in party elites' valence images with respect to dimensions of evaluation such as competence and integrity. I review empirical studies on multiparty elections, i.e., elections involving three or more major parties, that evaluate party elites' policy responses to these factors, along with empirical studies on the electoral consequences of parties' policy shifts. This review reveals a paradox: on the one hand, empirical studies conclude that parties systematically shift their policy positions in response to the factors that spatial modelers have identified. On the other hand, there is only weak and inconsistent empirical evidence that voters actually perceive parties' policy shifts, and/or that these shifts have significant electoral consequences. Thus the predictions of spatial theory are largely verified, whereas the assumptions that underpin spatial theory are called into question.