Annual Review of Political Science - Volume 14, 2011

Political science has been a central part of my life for over half a century. This essay records thoughts about the discipline, what it has given me, and what I hope I have given it. It records my entrance into the field and the direction of my work, and offers a personal view of the nature of political science. Using my own work as the examples, it traces the evolution of comparative survey research as a method. And it outlines a list of works on citizen voice and political equality. It focuses as well on the openness and breadth of the discipline, two of its finest virtues.

Leaders are part of virtually all organized political life. There have been important recent advances in modeling “leaders” as well as clever and innovative empirical studies. We review recent contributions from the political science, economics, and management literatures. We discuss the extent to which these new works represent advances over the major classic works on leadership and organization from the twentieth century. We identify important gaps, chief among them (a) theorizing a role for coercion, (b) modeling the endogenous emergence of leaders, and (c) empirically disentangling the effect of an individual leader from her office, especially when leaders emerge endogenously.

Mayhew's (1974) thesis regarding the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior has become the theoretical foundation for much of the research on the contemporary U.S. Congress. Recently, scholars have begun to suggest that the Mayhewian electoral incentive may apply to politics in earlier congressional eras as well. To assess these claims more systematically, we consider four conditions that serve as the building blocks of the electoral connection—ambition, autonomy, responsiveness, and accountability. Through a detailed review of the literature on electoral politics in Congress, we discover that all four conditions were present in a strict sense as far back as the Progressive Era. Moreover, considerable evidence suggests that a weaker, less formalized version of the electoral connection existed even earlier in American history. We conclude by briefly discussing the implications of these findings on the rapidly growing literature examining the historical and institutional evolution of Congress.

This article reviews some recent advances in research on presidential appointments and personnel. I focus specifically on research analyzing changes in the institutional environment of presidential personnel, how presidents make decisions about whom to appoint, and the effects of presidential appointees on outputs. I explore what we know about how presidents have worked to change institutions surrounding presidential personnel by increasing the number of appointees and augmenting White House personnel operations. I examine how presidents decide what factors to value when choosing personnel. When do presidents value loyalty, competence, campaign support, or other characteristics of potential appointees? Finally, I examine the effects of appointees on outputs. What influence do appointees have over outputs and why do some have more influence than others? I describe the general trajectory of research in each area as well as some emerging issues confronting scholars in these areas.

Economists have explained the 2007–2008 global financial crisis with reference to various market and regulatory failures as well as a macro-economic environment of cheap credit during the precrisis period. These developments had important political causes that scholars of international political economy (IPE) should have been well positioned to study before the crisis. How well did they anticipate the crisis? Although none foresaw all the causes, a number of IPE scholars correctly identified many of the dangers associated with new models of securitization as well as accompanying regulatory failures and the politics underlying them. IPE scholars were less successful in identifying the macroeconomic roots of the crisis, particularly the role of international capital flows in fueling the U.S. financial bubble, but some scholars did usefully explore the politics that contributed to the latter phenomenon. The study of IPE scholarship in this episode contains useful lessons for the field's future.

This review critically evaluates the largely consensual view that wars naturally and reflexively augment presidential power. After summarizing the key arguments advanced by presidency scholars in the aftermath of World War II, this article canvasses the existing empirical basis for their claims and the theoretical microfoundations upon which they are offered. Both appear wanting. Few systematic studies yield unambiguous evidence that the adjoining branches of government reliably support elements of the president's domestic or foreign policy agendas during war that they otherwise would oppose. And no one, to date, has offered a clear theory explaining why either Congress or the courts would behave in this way. The article therefore calls for continued empirical research on the causal effects of war on presidential power, and for renewed investments in theories that might account for the ways in which war figures into congressional and judicial voting.

The study of the politics of regulation has followed two distinct paths in recent years. “New institutionalism” research has focused primarily on the policy-making process, particularly the interplay between regulators (who implement policy) and their political principals (who attempt to control regulators' activity). In contrast, “new governance” scholarship has focused on strategies other than traditional “command-and-control” regulation that can encourage compliance with socially valued norms of behavior. Although these two lines of research approach highly distinct facets of regulation and have developed largely independently of each other, they exhibit a generally unacknowledged and extensive overlap in their theoretical structure and associated results. In this article, we compare these two approaches to regulatory politics. For each, we discuss how the interactions of key actors are conceptualized, consider the types of regulatory mechanisms used to manage behavior, and examine the breadth of outcomes that flow from these controls. We suggest that greater acknowledgment of the commonalities in the two approaches can advance each approach, even if they continue to be pursued separately, and can also help generate important synthetic avenues for further research.

A new judicial politics of legal doctrine has the potential to resolve foundational dilemmas and reconcile long-standing and counterproductive scholarly divisions by bringing together legal concerns and political science priorities. This doctrinal-politics approach highlights a relatively new formal apparatus known as the case-space model, and it invokes close ties between theoretical and empirical work and between the study of judicial behavior and actual legal practices and institutions. The case-space model is an adaption of standard policy-space modeling, tailored for the distinguishing features of judicial policy making. It allows for ideological differences between judges while expressing those differences in terms of legal rules that partition fact-filled legal cases into different dispositions. I explore the intellectual origins and primary contributions of the approach, focusing on how legal policy is affected by collegiality (the multi-member nature of appellate courts) and hierarchy (the multi-level division of court systems).

The recent wave of interest in the rhetorical tradition among political theorists can be attributed partly to the rise of theories of deliberative democracy, which focused attention on communication and discourse. Some scholars see in rhetoric a way to challenge the assumptions of Habermasian deliberative theory, while others aim to integrate rhetoric into a broader theory of deliberation. Insights taken from studies of Aristotle have been especially influential in producing a new set of questions for scholars interested in deliberation and in democratic communications more generally, in spite of the vast differences between ancient city-states and modern liberal democracies.

The Great Recession is not the end of capitalism. An innovative economy makes mistakes, but that is not a good reason to regulate it out of its innovations. The innovations—not unions or regulation—have increased real income per head by a factor of 100 in the places that have adopted bourgeois liberty and dignity. An innovative economy is “rhetorical” because, if our economic lives are not frozen by tradition, we must persuade each other what is to be done. “Rhetoric,” of course, is the ancient word for unforced persuasion. Samuelsonian economics, which is the usual kind, ignores words, persuasion, rhetoric. Yet one quarter of national income in a modern economy is earned from “sweet talk.” Discovery, which Austrian economists like Schumpeter and Kirzner emphasize, depends on rhetoric, and the rhetoric depends on ethics. Realist political philosophy, and agency theory in business schools, miss the ethical foundations of our lives.

Behavioral economics has become an important part of the economics profession. As a subfield, it tries to make sense of persistent violations of the standard model for economics. The major classes of violations involve social preferences (taking the well-being of others into account), time discounting (inconsistencies in valuing present and future commodities), and context (the effects of framing). Other violations involve well-known psychological heuristics such as overconfidence, constraints on strategic reasoning, emotions, and status differentials. These concepts are discussed in separate sections, and key experimental and empirical studies are noted.

This critical review of the new political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of seven parts. The first section briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about the potential impact of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons programs decisions. Finally, I lay out a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation.

Political science is fascinated with networks. This fascination builds on networks' descriptive appeal, and descriptions of networks play a prominent role in recent forays into network analysis. For some time, quantitative research has included node-level measures of network characteristics in standard regression models, thereby incorporating network concepts into familiar models. This approach represents an early advance for the literature but may (a) ignore fundamental theoretical contributions that can be found in a more structurally oriented network perspective, (b) focus attention on superficial aspects of networks as they feed into empirical work, and (c) present the network perspective as a slight tweak to standard models that assume complete independence of all relevant actors. We argue that network analysis is more than a tweak to the status quo ante; rather, it offers a means of addressing one of the holy grails of the social sciences: effectively analyzing the interdependence and flows of influence among individuals, groups, and institutions.

Recent political science research on the effects of core personality traits—the Big Five—contributes to our understanding of how people interact with their political environments. This research examines how individual-level variations in broad, stable psychological characteristics affect individual-level political outcomes. In this article, we review recent work that uses the Big Five to predict political attitudes and behavior. We also replicate some of these analyses using new data to examine the possibility that prior findings stem from sampling error or unique political contexts. Finally, we discuss several of the challenges faced by scholars who are currently pursuing or are interested in pursuing this line of inquiry. These challenges include refining theoretical explanations of how the Big Five shape political outcomes, addressing important measurement concerns, and resolving inconsistencies across studies.

Clientelism is characterized by the combination of particularistic targeting and contingency-based exchange. This method of contingent exchange thrives in both autocracies and democracies. It exists in a large variety of cultural contexts. Confronted with economic development, clientelism fades away in some political contexts but adapts and survives in others. This article explores our understanding of the origins and dynamics of clientelism, focusing on the relationships between clientelism and democracy and between clientelism and development. It then evaluates the connection between clientelism and a variety of political and economic outcomes, including democratic accountability, corruption, and public goods provision. It concludes by outlining some remaining empirical and theoretical challenges and highlighting recent innovations in data collection and empirical methods.

We review a large formal literature on economic models of voting and electoral politics. We discuss two broad classes of model: those focusing on preference aggregation and those that look at elections as mechanisms of information aggregation. We also explore the role of elections in situations of asymmetric information, where politicians take hidden actions or are otherwise better informed about policy than voters are, and examine the role of elections in selection and as incentive mechanisms. In the section on models of preference aggregation, we focus on the themes of exogenous candidacy, policy commitment, and the role of valence attributes. For information aggregation, we analyze how different aspects of the institutional environment affect aggregation, focusing on the structure of elections—whether simultaneous or sequential—and the number of choices, as well as the motivations of voters. Finally, in considering models of asymmetric information, we describe how these models shed new light on incumbency effects, campaign spending, and the policy choices of politicians.

This article deals with a variety of dynamic issues in the analysis of time-series–cross-section (TSCS) data. Although the issues raised are general, we focus on applications to comparative political economy, which frequently uses TSCS data. We begin with a discussion of specification and lay out the theoretical differences implied by the various types of dynamic models that can be estimated. It is shown that there is nothing pernicious in using a lagged dependent variable and that all dynamic models either implicitly or explicitly have such a variable; the differences between the models relate to assumptions about the speeds of adjustment of measured and unmeasured variables. When adjustment is quick, it is hard to differentiate between the various models; with slower speeds of adjustment, the various models make sufficiently different predictions that they can be tested against each other. As the speed of adjustment gets slower and slower, specification (and estimation) gets more and more tricky. We then turn to a discussion of estimation. It is noted that models with both a lagged dependent variable and serially correlated errors can easily be estimated; it is only ordinary least squares that is inconsistent in this situation. There is a brief discussion of lagged dependent variables combined with fixed effects and issues related to non-stationarity. We then show how our favored method of modeling dynamics combines nicely with methods for dealing with other TSCS issues, such as parameter heterogeneity and spatial dependence. We conclude with two examples.

A renewed, energetic interest in voting technologies erupted in political science following the 2000 presidential election. Spawned initially by the recount controversy in Florida, the literature has grown to consider the effects of voting technologies on the vote choice more generally. This literature has explained why localities have the voting technologies (lever machines, punch cards, etc.) they use. Although there are racial differences in the distribution of voting technologies used across localities, the strongest explanations for why local jurisdictions use particular technologies rest on legacies of past decisions. The bulk of the voting technology literature has focused on explaining how voting technologies influence residual votes, that is, blank, undervoted, and overvoted ballots. With the relative homogenization of voting technology since 2000, prospects for research that examines the effects of different machines on residual votes seem limited. However, opportunities exist to study the effect of voting machines historically, the effect of voting technologies on down-ballot rates, and the role of interest groups in affecting which voting technologies are made available to voters.