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Abstract

Two literatures—business and human rights and transitional justice—can be usefully combined to consider the issue of corporate complicity in past human rights violations in dictatorships and armed conflicts. But although the transitional justice literature emphasizes the positive role that international pressure plays in advancing justice, the business and human rights literature identifies international constraints in the area of corporate abuses. These include the lack of settled law establishing businesses' human rights responsibilities, the absence of courts to adjudicate corporate human rights violation cases, and the international focus on voluntary principles over legal obligations. Despite this unpropitious international climate, civil society mobilization and judicial innovation have advanced accountability efforts and overcome the strong veto power of business in some countries, often creatively blending international and domestic law. These efforts from below provide access to justice for victims and potential models for overcoming the current accountability gap.

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2016-10-27
2024-04-27
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