1932
0
  1. Home
  2. A-Z Publications
  3. Annual Review of Political Science
  4. Volume 17, 2014
  5. Article

Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 17, 2014

Field Experimental Work on Political Institutions

Abstract

A nascent but growing research area examines political institutions through the use of field experiments. I consider why field experimentation has been used infrequently in the study of political institutions and note that some research questions are not amenable to field experimentation. I review areas of research inquiry where field experimentation has enhanced scholarly knowledge about political institutions and representation. These areas include the study of race, representation, and bias in legislatures and courts; and policy responsiveness and legislative accountability. I synthesize this research by examining puzzles that emerge between the field experimental and observational work. I conclude with suggestions for promising research avenues, including the use of field experiments to study the bureaucracy. The discipline's understanding of political institutions could be improved with a greater emphasis on field experimental work.

Keyword(s): accountability, bureaucracy, courts, field experiments, legislatures, representation
Loading

Article metrics loading...

/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-174350
2014-05-11
2024-04-26
Loading full text...

Full text loading...

/deliver/fulltext/polisci/17/1/annurev-polisci-072012-174350.html?itemId=/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-174350&mimeType=html&fmt=ahah

Literature Cited

  1. Alvarez RM, Hopkins A, Sinclair B. 2010. Mobilizing Pasadena Democrats: measuring the effects of partisan campaign contacts. J. Polit. 72:31–44 [Google Scholar]
  2. Ashworth S. 2012. Electoral accountability: recent theoretical and empirical work. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 15:183–201 [Google Scholar]
  3. Avellaneda CN. 2013. Mayoral decision-making: issue salience, decision context, and choice constraint? An experimental study with 120 Latin American mayors. J. Public Adm. Res. Theory 23:631–61 [Google Scholar]
  4. Bailey MA. 2007. Comparable preference estimates across time and institutions for the court, Congress, and the presidency. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 51:433–48 [Google Scholar]
  5. Barnes J. 2007. Bringing the courts back in: interbranch perspectives on the role of courts in American politics and policy making. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10:25–43 [Google Scholar]
  6. Bergan DE. 2009. Does grassroots lobbying work? A field experiment measuring the effects of an e-mail lobbying campaign on legislative behavior. Am. Polit. Res. 37:327–52 [Google Scholar]
  7. Bertelli AM, Grose CR. 2009. Secretaries of pork? A new theory of distributive public policy. J. Polit. 71:926–45 [Google Scholar]
  8. Bertelli AM, Grose CR. 2011. The lengthened shadow of another institution? Ideal point estimates for the executive branch and Congress. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 55:767–81 [Google Scholar]
  9. Bertrand M, Mullainathan S. 2004. Are Emily and Greg more employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A field experiment on labor market discrimination. Am. Econ. Rev. 94:991–1013 [Google Scholar]
  10. Bianco WT. 1994. Trust: Representatives and Constituents Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press
  11. Boudreau C, McCubbins MD, Rodriguez DB, Weller N. 2010. Making talk cheap (and problems easy): how legal and political institutions can facilitate consensus. J. Empir. Leg. Stud. 7:868–85 [Google Scholar]
  12. Bowers J, Fredrickson MM, Panagopoulos C. 2013. Reasoning about interference between units: a general framework. Polit. Anal. 21:97–24 [Google Scholar]
  13. Broockman DE. 2013a. Black politicians are more intrinsically motivated to advance blacks' interests: a field experiment manipulating political incentives. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 57:521–36 [Google Scholar]
  14. Broockman DE. 2013b. Distorted communication, unequal representation: Constituents communicate less to representatives not of their race. Am. J. Polit. Sci. In press. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12068
  15. Burden B. 2007. The Personal Roots of Representation Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. . Press
  16. Butler DM, Broockman DE. 2011. Do politicians racially discriminate against constituents? A field experiment on state legislators. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 55:463–77 [Google Scholar]
  17. Butler DM, Karpowitz CF, Pope JC. 2012. A field experiment on legislators' home styles: service versus policy. J. Polit. 74:474–86 [Google Scholar]
  18. Butler DM, Kousser T. 2013. How do public goods providers play public goods games? Presented at State Polit. Policy Conf. May 23–25, Iowa City, IA. http://www.uiowa.edu/∼stpols13/papers/Butler%20How%20Do%20Public%20Goods%20Providers%20Play%20Public%20Goods%20Games%20SPPC%202013.pdf
  19. Butler DM, Nickerson DW. 2011. Can learning constituency opinion affect how legislators vote? Results from a field experiment. Q. J. Polit. Sci. 6:55–83 [Google Scholar]
  20. Canon DT. 1999. Race, Redistricting, and Representation Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  21. Chin ML. 2005. Constituents versus fat cats: testing assumptions about congressional access decisions. Am. Polit. Res. 33:751–86 [Google Scholar]
  22. Chin ML, Bond JR, Geva N. 2000. A foot in the door: an experimental study of PAC and constituency effects on access. J. Polit. 62:534–49 [Google Scholar]
  23. Clinton JD. 2012. Using roll call estimates to test models of politics. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 15:79–99 [Google Scholar]
  24. Clinton JD, Bertelli A, Grose CR, Lewis DE, Nixon DC. 2012. Separated powers in the United States: the ideology of agencies, presidents, and Congress. Am. J. Polit. Sci. 56:341–54 [Google Scholar]
  25. Cover AD, Brumberg BS. 1982. Baby books and ballots: the impact of congressional mail on constituent opinion. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 76:347–59 [Google Scholar]
  26. Cowen T, Glazer A. 1996. More monitoring can induce less effort. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 30:113–23 [Google Scholar]
  27. de Rooij EA, Green DP, Gerber AS. 2009. Field experiments on political behavior and collective action. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 12:389–95 [Google Scholar]
  28. Deaton A. 2010. Instruments, randomization, and learning about development. J. Econ. Lit. 48:424–55 [Google Scholar]
  29. Dropp K, Peskowitz Z. 2012. Electoral security and the provision of constituent service. J. Polit. 74:220–34 [Google Scholar]
  30. Druckman JN, Green DP, Kuklinski JH, Lupia A. 2006. The growth and development of experimental research in political science. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 100:627–35 [Google Scholar]
  31. Druckman JN, Green DP, Kuklinski JH, Lupia A. 2011. Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
  32. Enemark DP, Gibson CC, McCubbins MD, Zimmerman BA. 2013. The effect of holding office on the behavior of politicians Work. Pap., Dept. Polit. Sci., Univ. Calif. San Diego. http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/denemark/papers/Enemark_et_al_PoliticianExperiments.pdf
  33. Epstein L, Knight J. 2013. Reconsidering judicial preferences. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 16:11–31 [Google Scholar]
  34. Epstein L, Martin AD, Segal JA, Westerland C. 2007. The judicial common space. J. Law Econ. Organ. 23:303–25 [Google Scholar]
  35. Esterling KM, Neblo MA, Lazer DMJ. 2011. Means, motive, and opportunity in becoming informed about politics: a deliberative field experiment with members of Congress and their constituents. Public Opin. Q. 75:483–503 [Google Scholar]
  36. Fenno RF. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts Boston: Little, Brown
  37. Fiorina M, Plott C. 1978. Committee decisions under majority rule. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 72:575–98 [Google Scholar]
  38. Gailmard S, Patty JW. 2012. Formal models of bureaucracy. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 15:353–77 [Google Scholar]
  39. Gerber AS. 2011. Field experiments in political science. See Druckman et al. 2011 115–40
  40. Gerber AS, Gimpel JG, Green DP, Shaw DR. 2011. How large and long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised ads? Results from a randomized field experiment. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 105:135–50 [Google Scholar]
  41. Gerber AS, Green DP. 2012. Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation New York: Norton
  42. Green DP, Gerber AS. 2002. The downstream benefits of experimentation. Polit. Anal. 10:394–402 [Google Scholar]
  43. Griffin JD. 2014. When and why minority legislators matter. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 17327–36
  44. Griffin JD, Flavin P. 2007. Racial differences in information, expectations, and accountability. J. Polit. 69:220–36 [Google Scholar]
  45. Grose CR. 2005. Disentangling constituency and legislator effects in legislative representation: black legislators or black districts?. Soc. Sci. Q. 86:427–43 [Google Scholar]
  46. Grose CR. 2010. Priming rationality: a theory and field experiment of participation in legislatures Presented at New York Univ–Coop. Congr. Elect. Study Exp. Polit. Sci. Conf., Feb. 5–6, New York. http://cess.nyu.edu/conferences/2-2010/papers/GroseNYU2010.pdf
  47. Grose CR. 2011. Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
  48. Grose CR. 2013. Field experiments on elected and public officials: ethical obligations and requirements Presented at Ethics Comp. Polit. Exp. Conf., May 1–2, La Jolla, CA
  49. Grose CR, Malhotra N, Van Houweling RP. 2013. Explaining explanations: how legislators explain their policy positions and how citizens react Presented at New York Univ–Coop. Congr. Elect. Study Exp. Polit. Sci. Conf., Feb. 15, New York. http://cess.nyu.edu/policon2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/grose_malhotra_vanhouweling_nyu_cess.pdf
  50. Grose CR, Mangum M, Martin C. 2007. Race, political empowerment, and constituency service: descriptive representation and the hiring of African-American congressional staff. Polity 39:449–78 [Google Scholar]
  51. Grossman SJ, Hart O. 1983. An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica 20:231–59 [Google Scholar]
  52. Harden JJ. 2013. Multidimensional responsiveness: the determinants of legislators' representational priorities. Legis. Stud. Q. 38:155–84 [Google Scholar]
  53. Haynie KL. 2001. African American legislators in the American States New York: Columbia Univ. Press
  54. Heckman JJ. 2005. Rejoinder: response to Sobel. Sociol. Methodol. 35:135–50 [Google Scholar]
  55. Heckman JJ, Smith JA. 1995. Assessing the case for social experiments. J. Econ. Perspect. 9:85–110 [Google Scholar]
  56. Huber J. 2013. Is theory getting lost in the “identification revolution”?. Monkey Cage June 14. http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/14/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution
  57. Humphreys M, Weinstein J. 2009. Field experiments and the political economy of development. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 12:367–78 [Google Scholar]
  58. Kingdon JW. 1989. Congressmen's Voting Decisions Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press
  59. Lublin DI. 1997. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  60. Malesky E. 2013. Manipulating elites Presented at Ethics Comp. Polit. Exp. Conf., May 1–2, La Jolla, CA
  61. Malesky E, Schuler P, Tran A. 2012. The adverse effects of sunshine: a field experiment on legislative transparency in an authoritarian assembly. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 106:762–86 [Google Scholar]
  62. Mansbridge J. 1999. Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? A contingent yes. J. Polit. 61:628–57 [Google Scholar]
  63. Mansbridge J. 2003. Rethinking representation. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 97:515–28 [Google Scholar]
  64. Martin AM, Quinn KM. 2002. Dynamic ideal point estimation via Markov chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999. Polit. Anal. 10:134–53 [Google Scholar]
  65. Mason DP. 2013. Putting charity to the test: a case for field experiments on giving time and money in the nonprofit sector. Nonprofit Volunt. Sect. Q. 42:193–202 [Google Scholar]
  66. Mayhew DR. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press
  67. McCarty NM, Poole KT. 1995. Veto power and legislation: an empirical analysis of executive and legislative bargaining from 1961 to 1986. J. Law Econ. Organ. 11:282–312 [Google Scholar]
  68. McClendon G. 2012. Ethics of using public officials as field experiment subjects. Exp. Polit. Sci. 3:13–20 [Google Scholar]
  69. McClendon G. 2013. Race responsiveness, and electoral strategy: a field experiment with South African politicians Work. Pap., Dept. Polit. Sci., Harvard Univ.
  70. McDermott R. 2002. Experimental methods in political science. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 5:31–61 [Google Scholar]
  71. Michelson MR, Nickerson DW. 2011. Voter mobilization. See Druckman et al. 2011, pp. 228–42
  72. Miller G. 2005. The political evolution of principal-agent models. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 8:203–25 [Google Scholar]
  73. Miller WE, Stokes DE. 1963. Constituency influence in Congress. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 57:45–56 [Google Scholar]
  74. Minta M. 2011. Oversight: Representing the Interests of Blacks and Latinos in Congress Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  75. Moore S. 2011. We've become a nation of takers, not makers. Wall Street Journal Apr:1 [Google Scholar]
  76. Morton RB, Williams KC. 2010. Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab New York: Cambridge Univ. Press
  77. Palfrey TR. 2009. Laboratory experiments in political economy. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 12:379–88 [Google Scholar]
  78. Pérez EO. 2010. Explicit evidence on the import of implicit attitudes: the IAT and immigration policy judgments. Polit. Behav. 32:517–45 [Google Scholar]
  79. Pitkin HF. 1967. The Concept of Representation Berkeley: Univ. California Press
  80. Poole KT, Rosenthal H. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History New York: Oxford Univ. Press
  81. Rachlinski JJ, Johnson SL, Wistrich AJ, Guthrie C. 2009. Does unconscious racial bias affect trial judges?. Notre Dame Law Rev. 84:1195–246 [Google Scholar]
  82. Richardson L, John P. 2012. Who listens to the grass roots? A field experiment on information lobbying in the UK. Br. J. Polit. Int. Relat. 14:595–612 [Google Scholar]
  83. Rohde DW. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
  84. Salisbury RH, Shepsle KA. 1981. U.S. Congressman as Enterprise. Legis. Stud. Q. 6:559–76 [Google Scholar]
  85. Simon HA. 1965. Administrative decision making. Public Adm. Rev. 25:31–37 [Google Scholar]
  86. Swain CM. 1993. Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press
  87. Tate K. 2003. Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
  88. Wantchekon L. 2003. Clientelism and voting behavior: evidence from a field experiment in Benin. World Polit. 55:399–422 [Google Scholar]
  89. Whitby KJ. 1997. The Color of Representation Ann Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press
  90. Wilson RK. 1986. Forward and backward agenda procedures: committee experiments on structurally induced equilibrium. J. Polit. 5:390–409 [Google Scholar]
/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-072012-174350
Loading
  • Article Type: Review Article

Most Cited Most Cited RSS feed

This is a required field
Please enter a valid email address
Approval was a Success
Invalid data
An Error Occurred
Approval was partially successful, following selected items could not be processed due to error