1932

Abstract

In the wake of 25 United Nations Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting), international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact of the Kyoto Protocol on curbing emissions, and the gap between the ambitions of its successor and the Paris Agreement's lack of sanctioning mechanisms for addressing noncompliance, demonstrates both the difficulties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article reviews and draws lessons from a growing theoretical, experimental, and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and international climate policy.

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2021-10-05
2024-06-13
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