1932

Abstract

Cyber-vulnerabilities are being exploited in a growing number of control systems. As many of these systems form the backbone of critical infrastructure and are becoming more automated and interconnected, it is of the utmost importance to develop methods that allow system designers and operators to do risk analysis and develop mitigation strategies. Over the last decade, great advances have been made in the control systems community to better understand cyber-threats and their potential impact. This article provides an overview of recent literature on secure networked control systems. Motivated by recent cyberattacks on the power grid, connected road vehicles, and process industries, a system model is introduced that covers many of the existing research studies on control system vulnerabilities. An attack space is introduced that illustrates how adversarial resources are allocated in some common attacks. The main part of the article describes three types of attacks: false data injection, replay, and denial-of-service attacks. Representative models and mathematical formulations of these attacks are given along with some proposed mitigation strategies. The focus is on linear discrete-time plant models, but various extensions are presented in the final section, which also mentions some interesting research problems for future work.

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2022-05-03
2024-05-03
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