1932

Abstract

We present an overview and comparison of different game-theoretic approaches to Gricean pragmatics, including games of partial information, optimal answer models, error models, iterated best response models, and rational speech act models. We address phenomena of disambiguation, scalar implicature, and relevance implicature.

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/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-011817-045641
2018-01-14
2024-06-25
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