Annual Review of Psychology - Volume 62, 2011

Problem solving is a signature attribute of adult humans, but we need to understand how this develops in children. Tool use is proposed as an ideal way to study problem solving in children less than 3 years of age because overt manual action can reveal how the child plans to achieve a goal. Motor errors are as informative as successful actions. Research is reviewed on intentional actions, beginning with block play and progressing to picking up a spoon in different orientations, and finally retrieving objects with rakes and from inside tubes. Behavioral and kinematic measures of motor action are combined to show different facets of skill acquisition and mastery. We need to design environments that encourage and enhance problem solving from a young age. One goal of this review is to excite interest and spur new research on the beginnings of problem solving and its elaboration during development.

Given that we live in highly complex social environments, many of our most important decisions are made in the context of social interactions. Simple but sophisticated tasks from a branch of experimental economics known as game theory have been used to study social decision-making in the laboratory setting, and a variety of neuroscience methods have been used to probe the underlying neural systems. This approach is informing our knowledge of the neural mechanisms that support decisions about trust, reciprocity, altruism, fairness, revenge, social punishment, social norm conformity, social learning, and competition. Neural systems involved in reward and reinforcement, pain and punishment, mentalizing, delaying gratification, and emotion regulation are commonly recruited for social decisions. This review also highlights the role of the prefrontal cortex in prudent social decision-making, at least when social environments are relatively stable. In addition, recent progress has been made in understanding the neural bases of individual variation in social decision-making.

Speech perception has been studied for over a half century. During this time, one subfield has examined perception of phonetic information independent of its contribution to word recognition. Theories in this subfield include ones that are based on auditory properties of speech, the motor commands involved in speech production, and a Direct Realist approach that emphasizes the structure of the information reaching the perceiver. A second subfield has been less concerned with the acoustic-phonetic properties of speech and more concerned with how words are segmented and recognized. In this subfield, there has been a focus on the nature of communication among different levels of analysis (e.g., phonetic and lexical). In recent years, there has been a growing appreciation of the need to understand how the perceptual system dynamically changes in order to allow listeners to successfully process the variable input and new words that they constantly encounter.

Attention is a core property of all perceptual and cognitive operations. Given limited capacity to process competing options, attentional mechanisms select, modulate, and sustain focus on information most relevant for behavior. A significant problem, however, is that attention is so ubiquitous that it is unwieldy to study. We propose a taxonomy based on the types of information that attention operates over—the targets of attention. At the broadest level, the taxonomy distinguishes between external attention and internal attention. External attention refers to the selection and modulation of sensory information. External attention selects locations in space, points in time, or modality-specific input. Such perceptual attention can also select features defined across any of these dimensions, or object representations that integrate over space, time, and modality. Internal attention refers to the selection, modulation, and maintenance of internally generated information, such as task rules, responses, long-term memory, or working memory. Working memory, in particular, lies closest to the intersection between external and internal attention. The taxonomy provides an organizing framework that recasts classic debates, raises new issues, and frames understanding of neural mechanisms.

A great deal of research exists on the neural basis of theory-of-mind (ToM) or mentalizing. Qualitative reviews on this topic have identified a mentalizing network composed of the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and bilateral temporal parietal junction. These conclusions, however, are not based on a quantitative and systematic approach. The current review presents a quantitative meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies pertaining to ToM, using the activation-likelihood estimation (ALE) approach. Separate ALE meta-analyses are presented for story-based and nonstory-based studies of ToM. The conjunction of these two meta-analyses reveals a core mentalizing network that includes areas not typically noted by previous reviews. A third ALE meta-analysis was conducted with respect to story comprehension in order to examine the relation between ToM and stories. Story processing overlapped with many regions of the core mentalizing network, and these shared regions bear some resemblance to a network implicated by a number of other processes.

Over the past decade, an active line of research within the field of human causal learning and inference has converged on a general representational framework: causal models integrated with Bayesian probabilistic inference. We describe this new synthesis, which views causal learning and inference as a fundamentally rational process, and review a sample of the empirical findings that support the causal framework over associative alternatives. Causal events, like all events in the distal world as opposed to our proximal perceptual input, are inherently unobservable. A central assumption of the causal approach is that humans (and potentially nonhuman animals) have been designed in such a way as to infer the most invariant causal relations for achieving their goals based on observed events. In contrast, the associative approach assumes that learners only acquire associations among important observed events, omitting the representation of the distal relations. By incorporating Bayesian inference over distributions of causal strength and causal structures, along with noisy-logical (i.e., causal) functions for integrating the influences of multiple causes on a single effect, human judgments about causal strength and structure can be predicted accurately for relatively simple causal structures. Dynamic models of learning based on the causal framework can explain patterns of acquisition observed with serial presentation of contingency data and are consistent with available neuroimaging data. The approach has been extended to a diverse range of inductive tasks, including category-based and analogical inferences.

Patterns of socialization have changed in recent decades. Very young children now have fewer constraints on physical activities and greater freedom to assert themselves. This parenting style, I suggest, has implications for developmental processes related to upright locomotion, the use of hands as tools, and an embodied consciousness. This review explores four issues. First, I summarize historical trends in patterns of child-rearing and possible developmental consequences. Then I explore evolutionary patterns as a means to further developmental understanding of the initial phases of motor development. The third section reviews research on young humans' developmental paths toward locomotion and hand skills, examining early and current findings. Finally, I raise the issue of a body-action consciousness that emerges during infancy and the toddler years, suggest its developmental relevance, situate the theme in current developmental models, and explore applied implications.

In this article, we examine the construct of peer contagion in childhood and adolescence and review studies of child and adolescent development that have identified peer contagion influences. Evidence suggests that children's interactions with peers are tied to increases in aggression in early and middle childhood and amplification of problem behaviors such as drug use, delinquency, and violence in early to late adolescence. Deviancy training is one mechanism that accounts for peer contagion effects on problem behaviors from age 5 through adolescence. In addition, we discuss peer contagion relevant to depression in adolescence, and corumination as an interactive process that may account for these effects. Social network analyses suggest that peer contagion underlies the influence of friendship on obesity, unhealthy body images, and expectations. Literature is reviewed that suggests how peer contagion effects can undermine the goals of public education from elementary school through college and impair the goals of juvenile corrections systems. In particular, programs that “select” adolescents at risk for aggregated preventive interventions are particularly vulnerable to peer contagion effects. It appears that a history of peer rejection is a vulnerability factor for influence by peers, and adult monitoring, supervision, positive parenting, structure, and self-regulation serve as protective factors.

Wisdom represents a fruitful topic for psychological investigations for at least two reasons. First, the study of wisdom emphasizes the search for the continued optimization and the further cultural evolution of the human condition. Second, it exemplifies the collaboration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes. The growth and scope of psychological wisdom research over the past few decades demonstrate that it is possible to investigate this complex construct with empirical rigor. Since the 1970s, five main areas have been established: lay definitions of wisdom, conceptualizing and measuring wisdom, understanding the development of wisdom, investigating the plasticity of wisdom, and applying psychological knowledge about wisdom in life contexts.

Children learn moral values and social conventions through a process of socialization, much of which involves parenting. The process is bidirectional and involves a complex interplay between evolutionary predispositions and genetic and socio-cultural factors. Children's perception of, or assignment of meaning to, parenting interventions is central. Socialization occurs in different domains marked by different aspects of the parent-child relationship and different underlying mechanisms. Each domain requires different parenting actions that must be matched to the domain in which the child is operating and that result in different outcomes for the child. The domains include protection, mutual reciprocity, control, guided learning, and group participation, and are assumed to be operative in all cultures. The review concludes that children need to experience their parents as supportive and understanding, that they need structure, and that they need to feel they have some degree of control over their own actions.

Delusional beliefs are seen in association with a number of neuropathological conditions, including schizophrenia, dementia, and traumatic brain injury. A key distinction exists between polythematic delusion (here the patient exhibits delusional beliefs about a variety of topics that are unrelated to each other) and monothematic delusion (here the patient exhibits just a single delusional belief or else a small set of delusional beliefs that are all related to a single theme). A great deal of recent research has focused on identifying and investigating various different forms of monothematic delusion. We discuss a general theoretical approach to the understanding of monothematic delusions—a two-factor approach according to which understanding the nature and genesis of any kind of monothematic delusion involves seeking answers to two questions. The first question is, what brought the delusional idea to mind in the first place? The second question is, why is this idea accepted as true and adopted as a belief when the belief is typically bizarre and when so much evidence against its truth is available to the patient? We discuss in detail six different kinds of monothematic delusion, showing for each how neuropsychological considerations allow a first factor (responsible for the content of the belief) and a second factor (responsible for the failure to reject the belief) to be plausibly identified. Five difficulties confronting this two-factor account of monothematic delusion are then identified, and attempts are made to address each one.

This article reviews findings from 46 randomized experimental trials of preventive parenting interventions. The findings of these trials provide evidence of effects to prevent a wide range of problem outcomes and to promote competencies from one to 20 years later. However, there is a paucity of evidence concerning the processes that account for program effects. Three alternative pathways are proposed as a framework for future research on the long-term effects of preventive parenting programs: (a) through program effects on parenting skills, perceptions of parental efficacy, and reduction in barriers to effective parenting; (b) through program-induced reductions in short-term problems of youth that persist over time, improvements in youth adaptation to stress, and improvements in youth belief systems concerning the self and their relationships with others; and (c) through effects on contexts in which youth become involved and on youth-environment transactions.

Everyday intuitions suggest full conscious control of behavior, but evidence of unconscious causation and automaticity has sustained the contrary view that conscious thought has little or no impact on behavior. We review studies with random assignment to experimental manipulations of conscious thought and behavioral dependent measures. Topics include mental practice and simulation, anticipation, planning, reflection and rehearsal, reasoning, counterproductive effects, perspective taking, self-affirmation, framing, communication, and overriding automatic responses. The evidence for conscious causation of behavior is profound, extensive, adaptive, multifaceted, and empirically strong. However, conscious causation is often indirect and delayed, and it depends on interplay with unconscious processes. Consciousness seems especially useful for enabling behavior to be shaped by nonpresent factors and by social and cultural information, as well as for dealing with multiple competing options or impulses. It is plausible that almost every human behavior comes from a mixture of conscious and unconscious processing.

As a social species, humans have a fundamental need to belong that encourages behaviors consistent with being a good group member. Being a good group member requires the capacity for self-regulation, which allows people to alter or inhibit behaviors that would place them at risk for group exclusion. Self-regulation requires four psychological components. First, people need to be aware of their behavior so as to gauge it against societal norms. Second, people need to understand how others are reacting to their behavior so as to predict how others will respond to them. This necessitates a third mechanism, which detects threat, especially in complex social situations. Finally, there needs to be a mechanism for resolving discrepancies between self-knowledge and social expectations or norms, thereby motivating behavior to resolve any conflict that exists. This article reviews recent social neuroscience research on the psychological components that support the human capacity for self-regulation.

Attitudes and attitude change remain core topics of contemporary social psychology. This selective review emphasizes work published from 2005 to 2009. It addresses constructionist and stable-entity conceptualizations of attitude, the distinction between implicit and explicit measures of attitude, and implications of the foregoing for attitude change. Associative and propositional processes in attitude change are considered at a general level and in relation to evaluative conditioning. The role of bodily states and physical perceptions in attitude change is reviewed. This is followed by an integrative perspective on processing models of persuasion and the consideration of meta-cognitions in persuasion. Finally, effects of attitudes on information processing, social memory, and behavior are highlighted. Core themes cutting across the areas reviewed are attempts at integrative theorizing bringing together formerly disparate phenomena and viewpoints.

Current research on culture focuses on independence and interdependence and documents numerous East-West psychological differences, with an increasing emphasis placed on cognitive mediating mechanisms. Lost in this literature is a time-honored idea of culture as a collective process composed of cross-generationally transmitted values and associated behavioral patterns (i.e., practices). A new model of neuro-culture interaction proposed here addresses this conceptual gap by hypothesizing that the brain serves as a crucial site that accumulates effects of cultural experience, insofar as neural connectivity is likely modified through sustained engagement in cultural practices. Thus, culture is “embrained,” and moreover, this process requires no cognitive mediation. The model is supported in a review of empirical evidence regarding (a) collective-level factors involved in both production and adoption of cultural values and practices and (b) neural changes that result from engagement in cultural practices. Future directions of research on culture, mind, and the brain are discussed.

As reflected in the amount of controversy, few areas in psychology have undergone such dramatic conceptual changes in the past decade as the emerging science of heuristics. Heuristics are efficient cognitive processes, conscious or unconscious, that ignore part of the information. Because using heuristics saves effort, the classical view has been that heuristic decisions imply greater errors than do “rational” decisions as defined by logic or statistical models. However, for many decisions, the assumptions of rational models are not met, and it is an empirical rather than an a priori issue how well cognitive heuristics function in an uncertain world. To answer both the descriptive question (“Which heuristics do people use in which situations?”) and the prescriptive question (“When should people rely on a given heuristic rather than a complex strategy to make better judgments?”), formal models are indispensable. We review research that tests formal models of heuristic inference, including in business organizations, health care, and legal institutions. This research indicates that (a) individuals and organizations often rely on simple heuristics in an adaptive way, and (b) ignoring part of the information can lead to more accurate judgments than weighting and adding all information, for instance for low predictability and small samples. The big future challenge is to develop a systematic theory of the building blocks of heuristics as well as the core capacities and environmental structures these exploit.

Children growing up in the United States today typically spend a substantial portion of their early childhood years in early care and education (ECE) settings. These settings are thus an essential element of any effort to understand the ecology of early development. Research aimed at identifying the short- and long-term impacts of ECE experiences has a long history, the results of which now point to three key conclusions. (a) Although parents are the most important influence on children's development, ECE experiences have both short- and long-term impacts on a wide range of developmental outcomes that are best understood in interaction with family effects. (b) The quality of adult-child interactions in ECE settings is the most potent source of variation in child outcomes, although the amount of exposure to these settings also plays a role, perhaps especially with regard to social-emotional development. (c) Some children, notably those growing up in poverty, appear to be more vulnerable to variation in the quality of ECE settings than do other children. The frontiers of ECE research are addressing individual differences in children's responses to child care and approaching these settings both as sites for intervention research and as part of a wider web of important settings in young children's lives.

Low socioeconomic status (SES) is a reliable correlate of poor physical health. Rather than treat SES as a covariate, health psychology has increasingly focused on the psychobiological pathways that inform understanding why SES is related to physical health. This review assesses the status of research that has examined stress and its associated distress, and social and personal resources as pathways. It highlights work on biomarkers and biological pathways related to SES that can serve as intermediate outcomes in future studies. Recent emphasis on the accumulation of psychobiological risks across the life course is summarized and represents an important direction for future research. Studies that test pathways from SES to candidate psychosocial pathways to health outcomes are few in number but promising. Future research should test integrated models rather than taking piecemeal approaches to evidence. Much work remains to be done, but the questions are of great health significance.